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Litigators and Dealmakers:
A Comprehensive Critique of the California
Labor Commission’s Solis Decision and the
Talent Agencies Act in the Context of the
2018-2019 WGA-ATA Packaging Dispute
By TYLER EMERSON*

I. Introduction
FADE IN:
INT. BEVERLY HILTON HOTEL - DAY
At 3:00 in the afternoon on April 12, 2019, adversaries in pressed power
suits glare at each other across a large table. The situation is tense. On one
side are representatives for the Writers Guild of America, the largest union
for television and film writers in America. On the other side are negotiators
for the Association of Talent Agencies, the most important professional
organization for talent agents. The franchise agreement binding these two
groups expires at midnight. And this room is about to explode.
FLASHBACK TO:
EXT. HOLLYWOOD – ONE YEAR EARLIER.
As spring comes to Hollywood in 2018, the town prepares for an annual
tradition known as staffing season. Typically, this time of year is when the
symbiotic relationship between writers in the motion picture industry and
their agents is most potent. Agents prove their worth as marketers for their
clients, finding meetings for them at television networks, and buyers for their
work at the studios. Writers try to impress showrunners, producers, and
corporate executives. But 2018 is different. Something simmers under the
surface and Hollywood buzzes.
Writers malign their representatives, complaining about so-called
“packaging” deals. The scribes criticize their agencies for creating
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“conflicts-of-interest.” The whispers get loud enough that the Writers Guild
can no longer ignore them. Conversations are had. A vote is called. And in
April 2018, the Guild notifies the Association that the writers are terminating
the franchise agreement. The termination takes effect in twelve months.1
Over the following months, the Association and Guild engage in talks
to negotiate a new franchise agreement. However, the Guild does not wait.
It drafts a new franchise agreement, which includes a new code of conduct
for the talent agents: the Code of Conduct/Franchise Agreement of 2019
(herein “CCFA”).2 In February 2019, the Guild presents it to the
Association.3 This new franchise agreement takes a hard line on the
conflicts-of-interest which prompted the Guild to terminate the prior
franchise agreement.4 The Association is furious, and the Guild anticipates
that talent agents will refuse to come to the table. Hoping not to leave its
members without competent representation if the talent agents refuse to sign
on to the new terms, the Guild issues what shortly would become known as
the delegation letter. Therein, the writers’ union advises its membership to
use their attorneys to “fill some of the gap” in representation that may occur
if the talent agents refuse to sign onto the new CCFA.5
SMASH CUT BACK TO:
BEVERLY HILTON CONFERENCE ROOM – APRIL 12, 2019
The negotiators for the writers and the agents eyeball each other. The
franchise agreement expires at midnight. The CCFA, having been ratified by
the WGA only two weeks earlier, takes effect at one minute past.6 The
writers give the agents this one last opportunity to negotiate the terms of a
new franchise agreement in good faith. But in true Hollywood style, it takes
only an hour for negotiations to melt down in epic fashion. By 4:00 o’clock,

1. Rebecca Sun & Jonathan Handel, As Talent Agencies Push to Own Content, Some
Creators Cry Foul, HOLLYWOOD REPORTER (Sept. 12, 2018, 6:40 AM), https://www.holly
woodreporter.com/features/talent-agencies-push-production-rankles-wga-some-clients1142009.
2. Writers Guild of Am., Code of Conduct/Franchise Agreement of 2019,
https://www.wgaeast.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/4/2019/06/wga_verve_code_of_
conduct_franchise_agreement_5-16-19.pdf [hereinafter WGA CCFA].
3. David Robb. WGA Invites Agents To Sign Its New Code Of Conduct Banning
Packaging and Producing, DEADLINE (Feb. 21, 2019, 7:47 PM), https://deadline.com/2019/
02/wga-invites-agents-to-sign-its-new-code-of-conduct-banning-packaging-and-producing1202562512/.
4. WGA CCFA at § 3(A)(1)(“Agent shall at all times act as a fiduciary of Writer, and
shall comply with all fiduciary duties imposed by statute or common law”); see also WGA
CCFA at § 3(B).
5. Dave McNary, Writers Guild Preps Members for Life Without Agents, Debuts
Submission System, VARIETY (Apr. 1, 2019, 4:33 PM), https://variety.com/2019/tv/news/
writers-guild-debuts-submission-system-1203177953/.
6. Robb, supra note 3.
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the meeting craters after a series of “testy exchanges” and threats of legal
action.7 The parties retreat to their respective headquarters, and by 4:30, the
Guild blasts an e-mail to its members reminding them the CCFA takes effect
at midnight.8 The Guild adds one simple mandate: fire your agents if they
refuse to sign the new franchise agreement. Over the weekend, 7,000 of the
8,800 active writers in the Guild suddenly become unrepresented.9
But even without their traditional middlemen, business goes on. The
studios and networks have television shows to staff and feature films need
scriptwriters for development. They have writing positions to fill. And
writers still need those jobs. Thousands of writers wade into murky waters.
They look for jobs through hastily-put-together Guild-generated job posting
boards, informal mixers where they can meet with showrunners and
producers, and Twitter campaigns like #WGAStaffing Boost and
#WGAMIX to find the work they had, until then, relied on their agents to
find.10 But once these offers are made, who is to negotiate them on behalf of
the writers?

II. Agents, Attorneys and the Packaging Wars
A. Writers, Agents, and The Franchise Agreement
On one side of this dispute are the writers, represented by the Writers
Guild of America (herein, the “Guild” or “WGA”). The Guild is actually
comprised of two independent but affiliated labor unions, the Writers Guild
of America, West (WGAw) and the Writers Guild of America, East (WGAe).
These two organizations are so closely aligned that they are often
collectively referred to simply as a single union: “the” Writers Guild of
America. Formed in the 1950s, the WGA wields substantial influence in the
entertainment industry as the collective bargaining representative of almost
30,000 active and inactive members,11 including showrunners (chief writers
7. Cynthia Littleton, Sparks Flew in WGA-ATA Meeting as Negotiations Cratered,
VARIETY (Apr. 12, 2019, 7:56 PM), https://variety.com/2019/biz/news/wga-ata-contractfight-code-of-conduct-1203188786/.
8. Id.
9. Jonathan Handel, Over 7,000 Writers Fire Their Agents as New Reality Takes Hold,
HOLLYWOOD REPORTER (Apr. 22, 2019, 5:20 PM), https://www.hollywoodreporter.com/
news/7000-writers-fire-agents-as-new-reality-takes-hold-1203876.
10. Nellie Andreeva, Writers Show Unity With Big Turnout At WGA Solidarity Mixer,
DEADLINE (Apr. 18, 2019, 10:33 PM), https://deadline.com/2019/04/writers-unity-big-turn
out-wga-solidarity-mixer-1202598843/; Chris Lee, How Hollywood Writers Are Finding Jobs
After Firing Their Agents, VULTURE (Apr. 23, 2019), https://www.vulture.com/2019/04 /howwga-writers-are-finding-jobs-after-firing-agents.html.
11. WGAe-Writers Guild East AFL-CIO, Labor Organization Annual Report (Form
LM-2), at Schedule 13 (U.S. Dep’t of Lab., July 1, 2019) (reporting total membership of
5,116); WGAw-Writers Guild West Independent, Labor Organization Annual Report (Form
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and producers on television series), series staff writers, and screenwriters
responsible for almost every major motion picture and series. Each of the
major studios, their affiliated television networks, and major video-ondemand services are signatories to the WGA’s collective bargaining
agreement.12
On the other side of the dispute are the talent agents, represented by the
Association of Talent Agents (ATA). The ATA today is a trade association
representing talent agents and agencies in the entertainment industries.
Formed in 1937 as the Artists’ Managers Guild, the ATA’s members
represent almost all of the working talent in Hollywood today, including
screenwriters, showrunners, staff writers, actors, directors, and producers.
Generally, their job is to introduce talent (workers) to networks, studios,
streamers, and financiers (hiring entities) in hopes of soliciting offers from
those hiring entities. However, it is standard practice in the industry for talent
agents to negotiate material terms for their non-union clients and “overscale” terms13 for their union clients. The ATA’s membership includes the
major talent agencies: Creative Artists Agency (CAA), ICM Partners (ICM),
United Talent Agency (UTA), William Morris Endeavor (WME), Agency
for the Performing Arts (APA), The Gersh Agency, and Paradigm Talent
Agency which collectively represent almost all of writers’ earnings potential
in Hollywood.14 The ATA membership also includes over one hundred
smaller so-called “boutique” agencies.15
Guilds, writers and talent agents are formally bound together through a
so-called “franchise” agreement. At its heart, a franchise system is a private
licensing scheme in which union members “agree to use only agents who
have been ‘franchised’ [i.e., licensed] by their respective guilds; in turn, as a
condition of franchising, the guilds may require agents to agree to a code of

LM-2), at Schedule 13 (U.S. Dep’t of Lab., June 27, 2019) (reporting total membership of
24,440).
12. The major studios today are: Columbia Pictures, Paramount Pictures, Universal
Pictures, Walt Disney Pictures, and Warner Bros. Pictures. Their corporate sibling networks
include the major broadcast networks (ABC, CBS, NBC and FOX), as well as many cable
networks (e.g., The CW, USA Network, TBS, TNT, ESPN, MTV, Paramount Network,
Comedy Central, etc.). The major video-on-demand services include Netflix, Amazon
Studios, and Hulu, among others.
13. “Over-scale” terms mean those contract terms more advantageous to the individual
writer than those provided for in a collective bargaining agreement negotiated by such talent’s
respective union.
14. Jordan Crucchiola, The Hollywood Fight That’s Tearing Apart Writers and Agents,
Explained, VULTURE (Apr. 18, 2019), https://www.vulture.com/article/wga-hollywoodagents-packaging-explained.html (“CAA, WME, and UTA alone ‘account for almost 70% of
WGA members’ earnings,’ according to the Guild”).
15. Ass’n of Talent Agents, FAQ: What Is ATA?, ASS’N OF TALENT AGENTS, https://
www.agentassociation.com/index.php?src=gendocs&ref=FAQ&category=Main (last visited
Apr. 8, 2020).
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conduct and restrictions on terms included in agent-talent contracts.”16 These
arrangements are common across all the major Hollywood guilds,17 and are
permitted under federal law.18
In the 1970s, the WGA “desire[d] that a Code of Fair Practice be
promulgated . . . to minimize or eliminate any practices [then] mutually
deemed undesirable.”19 The Guild set out to do just that. While federal law
permitted the Guild to set any franchise terms it desired, it also understood
the economic reality that the terms could not be so onerous as to discourage
agents from representing Guild members. Thus, the WGA entered into
negotiations with the Artists’ Managers Guild, which would represent the
interests of the talent agents, to craft a franchise agreement acceptable to both
sides. Out of these negotiations the WGA drafted and ratified its standard
agency franchise agreement: the Artists’ Manager Basic Agreement
(“AMBA”).20 Each individual agent or agency would be required to
subscribe to its terms before becoming franchised.21 The AMBA would
control the scope and mode of agency representation for Guild writers for
the next forty-five years, until 2019.

16. Marathon Entm’t., Inc. v. Blasi, 42 Cal.4th 974, 983 (2008).
17. The Director’s Guild of America (DGA) uses the Agreement Between Association
of Talent Agents and Directors Guild of America, Inc., and the Screen Actors Guild-American
Federation of Television and Radio Artists (SAG-AFTRA) uses the Basic Contract Between
Screen Actors Guild and Association of Talent Agents and National Association of Talent
Representatives.
18. The franchise system is permitted under the National Labor Relations Act, which
grants to unions “the right to self-organization . . . for the purpose of collective bargaining or
other mutual aid or protection.” See U.S.C. § 157. As a function of self-organizing, unions
are generally permitted to create rules for their own members. In 1981, the Supreme Court
held the Clayton Act exempts from Sherman Act anti-trust liability a similar franchise system
employed by Actors’ Equity Association, specifically holding agents are a “labor group.”
H.A. Artists & Assocs. v. Actors’ Equity Ass’n., 451 U.S. 704, 714, 720 (1981). In dicta, the
Supreme Court noted “[t]he peculiar structure of the legitimate theater industry, where work
is intermittent, where it is customary if not essential for union for union members to secure
employment through agents, and where agents’ fees are calculated as a percentage of a
member’s wage, makes it impossible for the union to defend even the integrity of the
minimum wages it has negotiated without regulation of agency fees” and other agency
conduct. Id. WGA rules permit the union to discipline its members for engaging the services
of non-franchised agents. See Writers Guild of Am., const., art. X, sec. 1 (empowering guild
to discipline members for breaching Working Rules); see Writers Guild of Am., Code of
Working R., Working R. 1, Working R. 23 (discipline may include expulsion for breach of
working rules, including the rule forbidding the engagement of non-franchised agents).
19. Writers Guild of Am., Artists’ Manager Basic Agreement of 1976 at 1, Recital 3,
https://www.wgaeast.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/4/2018/09/amba1976.pdf
[hereinafter
WGA AMBA].
20. Id.
21. Id. at 1 (“Now, therefore, the following shall be the agreement between [ATA] on
the one hand and WGA on the other, and shall also be an agreement with such [Talent Agents]
as may subscribe hereto and by such subscription assume the obligations hereof”).
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It was the AMBA that ignited the 2019 packaging wars in Hollywood.
Pursuant to the terms of the AMBA, the Guild had the right to provide notice
to the ATA of its intent to terminate the AMBA, to be effective twelve
months later.22 On April 6, 2018, the WGA exercised its right and notified
the ATA.23 This started the one-year clock. Once the AMBA expired, talent
agents would no longer be permitted to represent Guild writers. To remain
franchised, they would have to sign whatever new franchise agreement the
WGA put in front of them, whatever the terms might be. That one-year clock
was set to expire at midnight on April 6, 2019, but by agreement between
the WGA and ATA was extended for a week to April 12, 2019, after which
the new CCFA franchise agreement would become effective.24
B. The Packaging Wars
1.Packaging Historically
To fully understand the tensions between agents and writers requires a
robust appreciation of how “packaging” evolved by 2019.25 Packaging is
implemented in almost every industry. Conceptually, it is simply a riskmitigation strategy. As the old saying goes, a great idea is only worth the
paper it’s printed on. Turning a good idea into something marketable takes
time, money and resources. So by bundling a great idea with talented
personnel able to develop it, produce it, take it to market and sell it (i.e., by
packaging it), the chances are higher that the investment of time, money and
resources into the idea will be recouped and generate a profit. A higher
chance of profitability improves the chance that investors will take a risk on
any given project. The film industry is no different. Packaging has existed
since the days of silent film. It is the way the business has always operated
and, perhaps, will always operate. But the real question then, as it is today,
is: whose job is it to put the package together?
In Tinseltown’s earliest years, movie studios bore the burden of
packaging their own productions. Studios hired producers whose job was to

22.
23.

Id. at 1, § 1(a).
Dave McNary, Writers Guild Seeks to Renegotiate Agreement With Agents,
VARIETY (Apr. 6, 2018, 5:25 PM), https://variety.com/2018/film/news/writers-guild-renego
tiate-agreement-agents-1202746532/.
24. Nellie Andreeva, Mike Fleming Jr. & David Robb. WGA & ATA Reach Last-Minute
Extension As Franchise Agreement Was Set To Expire, DEADLINE (Apr. 6, 2019, 10:00 PM),
https://deadline.com/2019/04/wga-ata-last-minute-extension-franchise-agreement-was-setto-expire-1202589771/.
25. See Brian T. Smith, Comment, Sending Agents To The Principal’s Office: How
Talent Agency Packaging and Producing Breach the Fiduciary Duties Agents Owe Their
Artist-Clients, 27 UCLA ENTM’T. L. REV. 173, 180-193 (2020) (more in-depth look at the
history and evolution of agency packaging historically).
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put together movies’ creative elements. This included developing stories,
hiring writers, directors, actors, and scores of other artists and technicians
whose services were required to make films. Studios negotiated with agents
on an ad hoc basis. Each script, each writer, each director, each actor was a
separate transaction that the studio would have to negotiate through its
producer. The agent’s job was merely “to field offers” from the producer and
to negotiate for their clients.”26 Typically, this earned the agent a
commission, usually in the amount of ten percent of their client’s gross
income from such deals.27
But agents were not just gatekeepers for their clients. Agencies became
known quantities whom studios could approach for the best or most popular
talent. Just as agents swung the doors open one way for their clients, they
swung the doors the other way for the studios. Agents became clearinghouses
for top-flight talent studios could approach to stock their films with stars who
would guarantee box office success. Ultimately, though, it remained the
studios’ job to aggregate talent for each of its projects. The agent’s job was
simply to represent individual clients in their dealings with the studios.
Eventually, though, “the role of the agent added an entrepreneurial
component, requiring creative instincts to combine certain literary material”
from writers “with appropriate director and/or acting talent in a package
presented to financing sources/studios.”28
It is unclear whether the transition to agency packaging was by design
on the part of the agents or the studios. But by the 1970s at the latest, studios
and networks sought to off-load the burden of packaging their own films and
episodic series. In an ever-growing trend, the studios shifted the burden of
content development and packaging creative personnel to independent
development companies, producers, casting directors and, of course, talent
agents.29 For the studios, this meant lower risk. And the studios, motivated
by those lower risks, increasingly were willing to provide guaranteed work
for known and packaged creative talent. For the agents, this meant more
26. Jessica Tuchinsky, The Talent Agent, in THE MOVIE BUSINESS BOOK, 213, 214
(Jason E. Squire ed., Routledge 4th ed. 2017).
27. Id. at 216.
28. Id. at 214.
29. See Gary Baum, New Hollywood Economy: Pay-for-Play Auditions for Actors Gain
Dominance, HOLLYWOOD REPORTER (Mar. 30, 2016, 5:00 AM), (“Cost-conscious networks
and studios offload a burden once held by productions to cast their own shows onto the labor
market itself. Millions of dollars previously spent on casting have been cut from balance
sheets. . . . The casting profession has undergone a transformation in the past three decades
from a realm defined primarily by staff positions to independent contractor roles”); See
Jonathan Handel, Agencies, Writers Guild on Collision Course Over Fees and More,
HOLLYWOOD REPORTER (Apr. 24, 2018, 6:47 AM) https://www.hollywoodreporter.com/
news/agencies-writers-guild-collision-course-fees-more-1105208 (“The key issues for the
guild: packaging, a half-century old system in which agencies assemble the creative elements
of a television series”).
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money. Taking ten percent from multiple clients on an individual project was
far more lucrative than taking ten percent from only one or two clients on
any given film. Less work for the studio. More money for the agent.
Guaranteed work for the clients. Simple economics. Efficient capitalism at
work. Everybody won. The practice was so common that while the WGA
and ATA acknowledged a “difference of opinion,” the AMBA expressly
permitted the practice of packaging.30 But at some point, packaging further
evolved.
Today, David Simon is best known as the creator of criticallyacclaimed television series like The Wire and Treme. But in the early 1990s,
he was still a crime reporter for the Baltimore Sun newspaper and had just
published his book, Homicide: A Year On The Killing Streets. An
unvarnished look at life in the Baltimore Police Department’s homicide unit
and Edgar Award-winner, Hollywood soon came calling. When megaproducer/director Barry Levinson made an offer for the rights, Simon
engaged the services of CAA agent Matt Snyder. On his website, Simon
describes his experience with the first evolution in agency practices as they
began to place more emphasis on closing deals than on the terms of the deals:
Then the contract comes back from Baltimore Pictures [Levinson’s
company] . . . . Fine for the option money, a little light on the contingent
pilot, pick-up and episodic payments and, of course, farce on the definition
of net profits. So I call Matt Snyder back and say so: This seems a little light
and it’s a first offer. Let’s go back to Levinson with a counter.
And Matt Snyder of CAA acts as if his client, me, has just thrown a
dead, rancid dog on the table. This is my first book sale to Hollywood and
Barry Levinson is an A-lister; I should be grateful for this offer and worried
that if I nickel-and-dime, Levinson may develop something else.31
After some cajoling by Simon, agent Snyder returned to Levinson and
brought back the terms his client wanted. Simon reports: “Snyder, relentless
carnivore that he is, returns to his client with pride and some pocket
change.”32 But not every writer is so lucky. Even by today’s standards,
Simon’s early 1990s experience is hardly unique. Writers in 2019 reported

30. WGA AMBA, supra note 19, at § 6(c) (“WGA has asserted that the services of
Writers in the fields of radio, television and motion pictures are connected with and affected
by the packaging representation of Writers and others by [Talent Agents]. . . . The
arrangements set forth in this agreement and Exhibit N, so far as they affect packaging
representation, constitute a mutual voluntary accommodation by each party of the practical
needs which each party considers its members may face with respect to the arrangements
under which [Talent Agents] represent writers for services or sale of literary materials or for
packaging”).
31. David Simon, “But I’m not a lawyer. I’m an agent”, AUDACITY OF DESPAIR (Mar.
18, 2019), https://davidsimon.com/but-im-not-a-lawyer-im-an-agent/ (article used with
author’s permission).
32. Id.
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agents refusing to return phone calls to writers who would not agree to
deals.33 Some writers even reported agents firing clients who refused to
capitulate to a studio’s proposed terms when they were on the table.34 A
former employee of one of the Big Four agencies reported that “agents would
push writers into packages to maximize the agency’s revenue, regardless of
whether it was in the clients’ best interests or even what [the writer]
wanted.”35
Then, these strained relationships evolved again. In the 1990s and early
2000s, the independent film boom hit. “Indies” gave unknowns an
opportunity to break in. They gave veterans “street cred.” And the financial
potential for a Pulp Fiction or Blair Witch Project-level payday gave
distributors a gambler’s high. The script became the hottest commodity in
town, screenwriters became bona fide movie stars in their own right, and
everybody from directors to actors became buyers. Everybody wanted the
next Sundance sleeper hit. Up-and-coming distributors like Miramax, New
Line and October Films wanted the next Best Picture Oscar winner. The
early aughts also saw the rise of “Peak TV,” turning television into gold, and
showrunners like Shonda Rhimes and Ryan Murphy into empires unto
themselves. The line between seller and buyer was no longer divided by the
line between the artist and the studio.
Suddenly, it was no longer unusual for a writer and buyer to be
represented by the same talent agent. Nor was it unusual for the agent to
represent both the seller and the buyer in the same transaction. Simon more
fully illustrates the conflict:
And now, here’s where the real fun starts:
We push forward a decade to 2002 when I have sold my own dramatic
television series to HBO. The Wire pilot turned out well enough that the
project is set to get a first-season order from HBO and my television agent,
Jeff Jacobs of CAA, suggests to me that this thing might really have legs.
“We want to package you,” he offers.
“Package me?”
“Yeah, we’ll take a package on this project and you get your ten-percent
commission back. Like with Homicide?
Hanh? “Jake, what the f*** are you talking about.”
“Homicide was packaged and we’ll do the same thing with The Wire.”
“Jake, slow down, what the hell does ‘packaged’ mean?”
33. Writers Guild of Am. W., WGA-Agency Campaign: Writers Share Their
Experiences With Agency Packaging And Producing, WRITERS GUILD OF AM. W. at 3, https://
www.wga.org/members/membership-information/agency-agreement/writers-share-their-exp
eriences#:~:text=WGA%2DAgency%20Campaign-,Writers%20Share%20Their%20Experi
ences%20With%20Agency%20Packaging%20and%20Producing,act%20in%20their%20bes
t%20interest (last visited May 5, 2019) [hereinafter WGA-Agency Campaign].
34. Id. at 40.
35. Id. at 7.
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And for the first time, Jacobs explains it to me.
...
There was a quiet on the phone. Until I asked a second question: “What
other talent did you package with me?”
“Barry Levinson.”
At which point, there was no more quiet.
“Jake, do you mean to say that you represented me, a pissant police
reporter from Baltimore in a head-on negotiation with one of Hollywood’s
A-list directors and you also represented the director? You represented both
sides in the sale of my book and when the low-ball offer came to me, Matt
f***ing Snyder acted like it was the only offer I might ever get? Is that what
you motherf***ers did?”
...
Then I asked another question: “Jake, do you have any written consent
from me on file in which I authorize you to rep both sides of the sale of my
book? I will answer that for you: You do not. I never authorized this. Not to
CAA. Not to my book agent. I never gave informed consent. I couldn’t.
Because I was never informed.36
Unfortunately for the young Simon, he had retained the services of an
agency that insisted on double-dealing from both sides of the transaction.
And this simultaneous representation was given the moniker “packaging.”
Even today, such simultaneous representation continues to occur.
2.The Packaging Wars of 2018 - 2019
It does not appear that Hollywood writers take issue with the concept
of pure packaging itself. Its traditional implementation is a sound business
decision for writers: a means of increasing the prospect of a job offer or a
script sale. However, writers have grave concerns about the conflicts that
have arisen of late with the final evolutions of so-called “packaging.” These
include double-dealing, self-dealing, and the systemic effects of those
conflicts. In 2018, screenwriters and television writers identified three major
issues that led to their vote to terminate the AMBA in favor of a new
franchise agreement with a stronger code of conduct for writers’
representatives.
a. Double Dealing: Packaging Fees
At some point in time, straight packaging reached its zenith. Agencies
began offering formal “package” arrangements to studios and networks in
which they would pay agencies directly in exchange for packaging services.

36.

Simon, supra note 31.
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In simple terms, agencies began taking fees from the very companies they
were supposed to be negotiating against on behalf of their clients. Studios
and networks today offer packages to agencies in two different forms. The
first is a partial package, in which multiple agencies split a single packaging
fee and each is responsible for only certain parts of the total creative bundle.
And then there is the full package, more lucrative and coveted by agencies.
A full package occurs when an agency is responsible for bundling all of the
creative elements on a single production and takes the entire fee. In 2016,
87% of all episodic series were subject to agency packaging arrangements,
with CAA and WME alone taking fees from 79% of all packaged series.37
Today, the major agencies have entire departments devoted to packaging.38
Recognizing that representing both buyers and sellers creates conflicts,
agencies have attempted to assuage their writer clients by agreeing to waive
their rights to their commissions. However, writers took two issues with this.
First and foremost, it led to agents who prejudiced their writer clients in order
to close deals with their studio and network clients. The relationship between
the studios/networks and the agents has become so cozy that agents are even
taking moral ownership over the shows. One writer relays a story from one
of the Big Four agencies:
As part of their training, the junior agents were given an in-house course
on contract negotiation . . . . One of the junior agents was assigned to
negotiate a staff writer’s deal on a packaged show. When this junior agent
started to present his proposed terms for the deal, one of the senior agents
cut in and said: ‘Let me just stop you right there. This is a staff writer on one
of our shows. You don’t negotiate these. You take what [the networks] offer,
say thank you, and move on.39
Other writers report agents who tout their ability to get their writer
clients to take lower fees. One showrunner (a writer in a position to hire other
writers on a television show) tells the story of his own agent approaching
him to “say, basically, ‘Since we’re packaging this, we can help you out with
some of our clients. This writer has a $20,000 quote, but I think I could get
them for $14,000.’”40 One WGA showrunner even reports an agent who
“cit[ed] the fact that he had gotten his client . . . to accept a fee substantially
below his quote. The agent was bragging about harming their own client.”41
The other issue is that packaging fees often vastly outpace the
commissions to which agencies would otherwise be entitled. One writer
37. David Robb, WGA Data: 87% Of All Scripted TV Shows Are Packaged, DEADLINE
(Mar. 15, 2018, 2:10 PM), https://deadline.com/2018/03/tv-series-packaging-agency-domi
nation-wme-caa-writers-guild-data-1202338755/.
38. WGA-Agency Campaign, supra note 33, at 7 (“Before I became a working writer, I
worked in the packaging department of a major agency”).
39. Id. at 12.
40. Id. at 15.
41. Id. at 13.
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describes his experience on a show that he created, when his agency
“negotiated for itself a packaging fee of over $70,000 an episode plus 10%
of the backend on the series – the single biggest backend stake,” lamenting
that “[his] agency will make more than [him] on this project.”42 For the
writers, the question is: if the studios/networks are willing to pay those kinds
of fees to the agency, then why would they not be willing to pay those kinds
of fees to the writers and other artists? Further exacerbating this problem is
that agency fees are tied to and come directly out of the budgets of film and
television shows being packaged.43 Packaging fees are not merely a
transactional cost a studio or network must bear as overhead, but a
production expense tied to a particular series or film. Along with costs to pay
stunt people and build props, packaging fees are built into the budgets of the
shows and movies themselves. As with the budget process in any other
industry, more money allocated to the packaging line item means less money
allocated to pay for things that make a movie or show better like actors,
directors, editors, props, location rentals, visual effects, special effects, or
any number of other production-related expenses. As one showrunner
lamented, “[p]aradoxically, [the agents’] own argument that they champion
independent film collapses on itself because packaging fees take money out
of the budget. That money could go to shooting days or special effects.”44
b. Self-Dealing: Agency-Owned Productions
The other major conflict in the packaging wars evolved only recently.
In 2016, the major talent agencies began to diversify their portfolios by
taking direct pecuniary interests in the projects their clients work on, and
equity interests in the companies that produce those projects. For example,
in December 2016, CAA hired former ABC president Paul Lee to organize
and create an agency-owned television studio.45 In 2017, William Morris
Endeavor touted its packaging when it announced, with IMG, the formation
of Endeavor Content, which takes ownership interests in the projects it
packages.46 And in 2018, UTA announced it would use $200 million to fund
a joint television production venture with Valence Media and Media Rights

42. Id. at 2.
43. Id. at 10 (“The package fee in the budget is among the highest in the industry”).
44. Id. at 19.
45. Elizabeth Wagmeister & Daniel Holloway, Former ABC Chief Paul Lee Eyes TV
Production Company Set Up at CAA, VARIETY (Dec. 8, 2016, 4:06 PM), https://variety.com/
2016/tv/news/paul-lee-caa-production-company-1201937600/.
46. Jeremy Kay, WME, IMG film and TV sales groups form Endeavor Content, SCREEN
DAILY (Oct. 16, 2017) https://www.screendaily.com/news/wme-img-film-and-tv-sales-grou
ps-form-endeavor-content-/5123308.article; see also Sun & Handel, supra, note 1.
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Capital.47 In hiring the writers and other artists, the agencies are not simply
representing both sides of the transactions anymore. Instead, the agencies are
one side of the transaction and are expected to negotiate against themselves
in representation of their writer clients. This constitutes not simply doubledealing, but self-dealing, as the agents become employers of their own
clients.
c. Labor Market Constriction and Creative Limitations
Along with conflicts-of-interest arising from packaging and agencyowned productions, writers are also concerned with the indirect
consequences of those conflicts. In addition to showrunners’ complaints that
packaging fees are a cancer on a show’s budget, the writers and other talent
complain about the constraining impact packaging has on the Hollywood
labor market. On a microlevel, the market for writers artificially and
arbitrarily constricts when agents cause unnecessary delays or outright refuse
to close deals for their writer clients. The WGA reports several instances in
which agents have refused to work for writers because the agencies have
greater interests in packaging:
I like working on a TV writing staff, but agents are not interested in
representing writers who want to do that. They’re only interested in writers
who develop new projects because that’s how they get a package fee. I went
looking for an agent and met with some low level agents at one of the big
agencies. They seemed very excited until I said I wanted to work as a staff
[writer] on a [pre-existing] show rather than develop [new projects]. They
said, ‘If you’re not into developing, then we’re not interested. It’s not worth
it to us.’”48
A network challenged the formula for a package fee that an agency was
insisting upon. . . . During a yearlong stalemate the agency withheld series
pitches to that network from all their clients. No agency client pitched a
series to that network that year. Not because the network said they wouldn’t
take the pitches; not because the network wasn’t offering enough
compensation to the writers. Solely because the agency put its compensation
ahead of its clients’ job opportunities, no writers from that agency sold a
series to that network. Series that would have sold didn’t.49
I was on my way to a meeting with a network executive to pitch a show
– a ‘mere formality,’ the exec said, as he was a friend who had told me over
dinner a few weeks earlier to ‘just come in and tell it to my people and we’ll
47. Rebecca Sun, UTA, MRC and Valence Media Form Joint Television Venture,
HOLLYWOOD REPORTER (Oct. 10, 2018, 12:30 PM) https://www.hollywoodreporter.com/
news/uta-mrc-valence-media-form-joint-television-venture-1151280.
48. WGA-Agency Campaign, supra note 33, at 6.
49. Id. at 9.
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have you writing in a week.’ During my drive, I get a call from my agent
who says, ‘Turn around. I canceled the meeting. . . . They won’t make a
packaging deal with us.50
Agents make their own packaging deals the first order of business with
studios and networks. Writers complain that if an agent’s overzealous
negotiation of the packaging contract does not scuttle a negotiation entirely,
it almost always results in delays negotiating and closing the writers’
contracts.51 While writers wait for these deals to close, they are effectively
shut out of other jobs due to potential unavailability. And there are larger
systemic issues that arise from modern-day packaging.
The larger problem facing writers is that they have access only to the
studios, networks or productions represented by their agencies. Showrunners
are forced to hire staff writers represented only by their own agencies.
Agents shut out staff writers from every studio with which the agencies do
not have packaging agreements in place. Additionally, packaging affects
showrunners, staff writers and film writers because packages are limited not
just to writers, but every creative element. Agents refuse to help series writers
and film writers meet with actors, directors, and producers unless the same
agency represents those other creative talents. At least one showrunner
reported that a desired actor’s agent refused to even consider an offer on his
show. Said the actor’s agent: “Not gonna lie to you, we’re doing everything
we can to kill his [i.e., the actor’s] interest in the project . . . No reason we
should split packaging fees if we don’t have to.”52 Another showrunner
explains that “[p]ackaging limits us creatively. In setting up a show, I have
access to 25% of the talent in town” – the talent represented only by his own
agency.53 In other words, a staff writer can only get a job on a show if the
same agency represents the showrunner. The same is true for actors and
directors. This effectively constrains the labor market for artists’ services.
C. What does any of this have to do with attorneys?
At the eleventh hour of the negotiations between the Association and
the Guild in 2019, ATA executive director Karen Stuart drew attorneys
directly into the growing dispute. Given the WGA’s CCFA franchise
agreement, which takes a hard line position on the conflicts-of-interest
50. Id. at 27.
51. Id. at 4 (“This deal took a very long time to close. After it finally did, I talked to the
exec at the studio about the delay, and she told me that the packaging fee had held things up.
My agency wouldn’t close the deal without the fee”); also id. at 32 (“My manager asked the
actor’s agent what was going on. The agent said, ‘Not gonna lie to you, we’re doing
everything we can to kill his interest in the project. . . . No reason we should split packaging
fees if we don’t have to’”).
52. Id. at 32.
53. Id. at 18.
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arising from packaging and agency-owned productions, the WGA
anticipated the possibility that negotiations with the ATA would break down
before expiration of the AMBA. Not wanting its membership to lose all
forms of representation at the height of staffing season, the WGA devised a
plan in the event the ATA did not sign off on the CCFA. On March 20, 2019,
the WGA issued the following so-called “delegation letter:”54
Writers Guild of America, West, Inc., together with Writers Guild of
America, East, Inc. (collectively, “Guild” or “WGA”), is the exclusive
representative for the purpose of collective bargaining of all writers
(“Writers”) employed under the WGA Theatrical and Television Basic
Agreement (“MBA”). As such, under the National Labor Relations Act, 29
U.S.C. § 151 et seq., the Guild is vested with the exclusive right to bargain
over wages, hours, and terms and conditions of employment on behalf of
such Writers. The Guild, in its sole discretion, may delegate its exclusive
bargaining authority on terms that it establishes.
The Guild, as the exclusive bargaining representative,55 hereby
authorizes you to procure employment and negotiate overscale terms and
conditions of employment for individual Writers in connection with MBAcovered employment and MBA-covered options and purchases of literary
material, consistent with Article 9 of the MBA. Nothing herein shall be
construed to permit you to negotiate terms and conditions of employment
inferior to or in conflict with the terms of the MBA.
The WGA followed this with a letter to its members in which it
deputized attorneys: “other representatives can support [Guild] members
who could soon be without representation . . . . Many Guild members have a
manager or attorney who can help fill some of the gap.”56
The ATA ignored the WGA’s letter for nearly a month. Negotiations
continued to stall. Finally, on April 12 – the final deadline – the ATA fired
back. The ATA’s attorneys issued a public letter “that the WGA’s purported
delegation violates both California’s Talent Agencies Act (“TAA”) and New
York’s General Business Law,” and demanded the WGA retract the
delegated authorization.57 The ATA then issued a stern threat to all
54. Dave McNary, WGA Authorizing Managers, Lawyers to Make Deals if Agents Are
Fired, VARIETY (Mar. 20, 2019, 11:17 PM), https://variety.com/2019/film/news/wga-mana
gers-lawyers-deals-agents-fired-1203168913/.
55. The Guild asserts in this letter that it is the exclusive bargaining representative for
all members of the union in all cases. However, other commentators find the WGA’s claim
dubious. See Richard Kopenhefer, Deputy Lawyer; WGA Tries Preemption Route in ATA
Dispute, SHEPPARD MULLIN LAB. & EMP. LAW BLOG (Apr. 4, 2019), (last visited Apr. 10,
2019)
https://www.laboremploymentlawblog.com/2019/04/articles/collective-bargaining/
wga-preemption-route-ata-dispute/.
56. McNary, supra note 54.
57. Letter from Marvin S. Putnam, Attorney, Latham & Watkins LLP, to WGA West
Board of Directors & WGA East Council, Re: WGA Purported Delegation of Authority,
AGENTS ASS’N (Apr. 12, 2019), https://www.agentassociation.com/clientuploads/Letter_
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entertainment lawyers in California: “The [ATA] considers any and all
unlawful procurement entered into at the behest of the WGA to be unfair and
unlawful competition that will harm the ATA and its member agencies. . . .
ATA will take appropriate action as needed, against any person engaged in
unfair competition, to protect the lawful interests of its members.”58
Calling the WGA’s position both “shocking and disturbing,” Stuart
published a follow-up letter to her membership in which she doubled down
on the ATA’s position: “I want to reiterate that we are confident in our
position – the law is crystal clear. . . . [T]here are multiple decisions from
the California Labor Commission holding that no one other than a licensed
talent agent – not a manager, not an attorney – can procure employment on
behalf of an artist. It is important to note that ‘procure’ in this situation
includes all negotiations on behalf of an artist.”59 She then magnified the
ATA’s earlier threat: “We are evaluating all legal options to address this
unlawful conduct. We request that, to the extent you are aware of managers
and attorneys who are embracing the WGA’s request to procure and
negotiate employment in violation of the law, you track this information and
the names of those who are participating in unfair competition, and provide
that information to ATA’s attorneys.”60 The ATA thereby threatened to
install an observe-and-report regime unseen since the days of the blacklist.
Given the threats of legal action, lack of guidance from the state bar,
and general confusion, many Hollywood attorneys abandoned their writer
clients. One anonymous “heavyweight” entertainment attorney said that
“[t]he WGA has no right to anoint anyone as a de facto agent to do anything
for any of its members that an agent would do. . . . If they want [to] take their
members down the garden path, I suggest they re-read relevant New York
and California law.”61 Another anonymous but “prominent” Hollywood
attorney reported “[t]he word that is going out all over town to entertainment
lawyers is ‘pencils down.’”62 A third anonymous “influential” attorney said
to_members_4-18-19.pdf [hereinafter Putnam Letter]; David Robb, Writers & Agents Set One
Last Round Of Talks Before Tonight’s Deadline; WGA Responds To ATA Demand That Guild
Not Deputize Managers & Lawyers To Replace Agents – Update, DEADLINE (Apr. 12, 2019,
12:48 PM), https://deadline.com/2019/04/ata-demands-wga-cease-plan-to-deputize-manag
ers-and-lawyers-to-replace-agents-1202594854/.
58. Putnam Letter, supra note 57.
59. Letter from Karen Stuart, Executive Director, Association of Talent Agents, to
Members, Association of Talent Agents, Re: WGA Attempted “Delegation” of Authority to
Managers and Lawyers, AGENTS ASS’N (Apr. 18, 2019), https://www.agentassociation.com/
clientuploads/Letter_to_members_4-18-19.pdf [hereinafter Stuart Letter].
60. Id.
61. Dominic Patten & Nellie Andreeva, WGA & Agencies Battle Opens New Front As
Lawyers Take “Pencil’s Down” Approach On New Deals For Scribes, DEADLINE (Apr. 15,
2019, 5:50 PM), https://deadline.com/2019/04/wga-deputization-scheme-hollywood-lawye
rs-managers-agents-mass-firing-code-of-conduct-1202596416.
62. Id.
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“[f]orget about it, the whole situation is too toxic,” and dismissed the WGA’s
advice as “the misplaced thinking of amateurs who are hurting their members
with disinformation.”63 These attorneys seemed hesitant, with fears raised
that representing writer clients without an agent could result in complaints
to the State Bar, investigations and even disbarment.64 However, a
significant number of attorneys rejected the “pencils down” movement
advocated by these few attorneys on the grounds that the ATA’s position was
grounded on flawed Labor Commission decisions.65
Unwittingly, the ATA made attorneys stakeholders in this dispute by
raising the question in an adversarial tone: are licensed attorneys entitled to
or prohibited from representing their writer clients in negotiations with
studios, networks, and other buyers? As set forth in this article, the Talent
Agencies Act does not prohibit attorneys from doing so. Furthermore, public
policy, the State Bar Act and the Rules of Professional Conduct for attorneys
authorize them to represent Hollywood writers and other artists without a
talent agency license or the cooperation of a licensed talent agency.

III. The Talent Agencies Act Does Not Prohibit Attorneys
from Negotiating Artists’ Contracts
A. The Talent Agencies Act Generally
The Talent Agencies Act (herein, the “TAA” or the “Act”) is a statutory
scheme enacted in 1978 to regulate and license talent agents in California for
the protection of writers and other entertainers against unscrupulous talent
marketers.66 It compels all persons or businesses that “procure” employment
and engagements for artists to obtain a license from the California Labor
Commission,67 and sets forth specific licensing requirements.68 The Act also
regulates minor formalities in the relationship between talent agents and their
clients, such as specific forms that agency contracts must take.69 The TAA
grants to the Labor Commission original jurisdiction over disputes between
artists and their representatives arising from violations of the Act, and de
novo review in the California district courts.70 Together, the TAA and the
General Rules and Regulations for Artists’ Managers set forth in the
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Nellie Andreeva, Lawyers Make Case For Legality Of Negotiating Agent-Less
Writer Deals, DEADLINE (Apr. 19, 2019, 11:11 AM), https://deadline.com/2019/04/writersguild-agencies-lawyers-deals-talent-agencies-act-state-bar-act-precedent-1202598143/.
66. Cal. Lab. Code §§ 1700 et seq. (Deering 2020).
67. Cal. Lab. Code § 1700.5.
68. Cal. Lab. Code §§ 1700.6-1700.22.
69. Cal. Lab. Code §§ 1700.23-1700.41.
70. Cal. Lab. Code § 1700.44.
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California Code of Regulations71 form the code for licensing and regulating
talent agents within the state.
B. The California Labor Commission applied unlawful principles of
statutory construction to render its decision in Solis v. Blancarte, the
case on which the ATA relies
Throughout this dispute, the ATA has placed great reliance on a single
administrative decision: the California Labor Commission’s 2013 decision
in the matter of Solis v. Blancarte.72 Mario Solis was a news anchor in Los
Angeles. James Blancarte was his attorney, licensed to practice law in
California. But Blancarte was not licensed as a talent agent. In 2002, a local
news station approached Solis and expressed an interest in hiring him. Solis
asked his long-time attorney, Blancarte, to handle negotiation of his
employment agreement. Blancarte did. But in 2011, Solis sued Blancarte for
alleged violations of the TAA to recover contingent fees paid to the attorney
pursuant to their legal services agreement. In proceedings before the Labor
Commission, Solis complained that Blancarte violated the TAA by
negotiating the contract without first being licensed as a talent agent.73
Blancarte asserted the defense that he was a duly-licensed attorney
merely engaged in the practice of law when he negotiated Solis’ contract
with the news station. Thus, he argued, his activities should have been
exempt from regulation under the Talent Agencies Act.74 The Labor
Commission disagreed, stating:
[I]t is of no moment that some of the skills [Blancarte] may have
brought to the negotiations on behalf of petitioner are the result of
skills for which he has been licensed as an attorney. As Labor Code
section 1700.44 makes unequivocally clear, when someone who is
not licensed under the TAA wishes to bring such skills to bear on
the negotiation of an artist’s contract, he must do so “in conjunction
with, and at the request of, a licensed talent agency.”75
Blancarte never appealed the Solis decision. Consequently, since 2013,
entertainment attorneys in California have worked in legal gray areas while
negotiating agreements for Hollywood clients unless such attorneys are

71. Gen. R. and Regs. for Artists’ Managers, Cal. Code Regs. tit. 8, §§ 12000-12033
(2020).
72. Solis v. Blancarte, TAC-27089 (Cal. Lab. Comm’n. Sept. 30, 2013), https://www.
dir.ca.gov/dlse/TAC/TAC-27089%20M%20Solis%20v%20Blancarte%20093013.pdf.
73. Id. at 1-5.
74. Id. at 8.
75. Id. at 8-9.
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dually-licensed as attorneys and as talent agents.76 But their uncertainty is
not supported when one considers the Labor Commission’s faulty reasoning
in Solis.
Generally, administrative agencies like the Labor Commission are
authorized to interpret the statutes they are charged with enforcing.77
However, this is not plenary authority. While an agency’s interpretation is
given “great weight,”78 it must be based on principles of statutory
construction and “must be given a reasonable and common sense
construction in accordance with the apparent purpose and intention of the
lawmakers.”79 The Labor Commission was required to utilize canons of
statutory construction in Solis, including a review of legislative history, to
interpret the Talent Agencies Act. However, the Labor Commission
abrogated its duty by relying on its own equally faulty 2005 decision in
Danielewski v. Agon Investment Company.80 The Danielewski case,
however, was wholly inapplicable because the respondent was a talent
manager, not an attorney. Additionally, the Labor Commission relied on a
mere dictionary definition of “procure” for its holding, despite ambiguity
within the definition itself. But closer review of Danielewski reveals a
decrepit precedential foundation; Danielewski relied on yet another faulty
Labor Commission case: the 1982 matter of Pryor v. Franklin.81
So how did the Labor Commission in 1982 determine that the California
legislature intended negotiation of an artist’s contract to constitute per se
procurement under the Talent Agencies Act? The fact is that the Labor
Commission fabricated the statutory construction in whole cloth, with no
reliance on legislative or judicial authority:
Respondent even admitted in his Response to the Petition and
in his sworn deposition testimony that he had negotiated the
employment agreements and engagements for Petitioners during the
period 1975 through September 1980. Furthermore, Respondent’s
counsel conceded at the hearing that Respondent had been
Petitioners’ “sole and exclusive negotiator”.

76. Id. at 6-7.
77. Buchwald v. Super. Ct., 254 Cal.App.2d 347, 355 (1967); see also PacifiCare Life
& Health Ins. Co. v. Jones, 27 Cal.App.5th 391, 401 (2018) (“an agency’s authority to enforce
or administer a statute includes the power to adopt a regulation ‘to implement, interpret, or
make specific the law enforced or administered by it”).
78. W. States Petrol. Ass’n. v. Bd. of Equalization, 57 Cal. 4th 401, 437 (2013)
(Kennard, J., concurring).
79. Buchwald, 254 Cal.App.2d at 354.
80. Annie Danielewski v. Agon Investment & Robert Edsel, TAC 41-03, at 15-16 (Cal.
Lab. Comm’n. Oct. 28, 2005), https://www.dir.ca.gov/dlse/TAC/2003-41%20Annie%
20Danielewski%20v%20Agon%20investment%20&%20Robert%20Edsel.pdf.
81. Id. at 15-16.
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The evidence of Respondent’s active and continuous participation in
the process of negotiating the terms of Pryor’s employment over the five year
period would, standing alone, constitute sufficient evidence of unlawful
procurement and attempted procurement to warrant and justify a finding that
Respondent had engaged in the occupation of an artist’s manager and talent
agent without a license and in so doing had flagrantly violated the Act.
We reject Respondent’s contention that to prove unlawful procurement
or attempted procurement one must offer evidence of solicitation or an
initiated contact. This argument runs afoul of well established principles
which we choose to follow, namely, that the furthering of an offer constitutes
a significant aspect of procurement prohibited by law since procurement
includes the entire process of reaching an agreement on negotiated terms
where the intended purpose is to market an artist’s talent. These principles
are totally in accordance with the purposes of the Act.82
Notice the lack of internal citations.
So, the question naturally arises: from what authority do these “well
established principles” arise that the Labor Commission supposedly
followed? The answer: none. The Labor Commission cited to no authority
articulating these “well established principles.” The Labor Commission
engaged in zero study or analysis of committee reports or legislative
statements. The Labor Commission engaged in zero analysis of the
legislative history of the statute. And yet these unidentified principles
became the basis for the 1982 Pryor decision, which in turn became the basis
for the 2005 Danielewski decision, which in turn became the basis for the
2013 Solis decision on which the ATA relied. If Pryor is the poisonous tree,
then Solis is its fruit.
The California Labor Commission relied on precedent that arbitrarily
and ambiguously cited authorities it could not identify. Furthermore, the
Labor Commission failed to apply canons of statutory construction. And in
clear violation of California state law, the Labor Commission failed to render
“a reasonable and common sense construction in accordance with” the
legislative intent behind the Talent Agencies Act.83 Courts should disregard
and give no deference to Solis.84
C. The plain language of the Talent Agencies Act neither prohibits nor
authorizes licensed attorneys to engage in activities constituting the
“practice of law” in California
82. Pryor v. Franklin, TAC 17 MP 114, at 14-15 (Cal. Lab. Comm’n, Aug. 12, 1982),
https://www.dir.ca.gov/dlse/TAC/17%20MP-114.pdf.
83. Buchwald, 254 Cal.App.2d at 354.
84. W. States Petrol.,57 Cal.4th at 437 (“courts give the agency’s interpretation of
statutory language ‘great weight’ but do not otherwise defer”) (Kennard, J., concurring).
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The heart of the TAA lies in Section 1700.4 of the Labor Code. This
section defines a “talent agent” as “a person or corporation who engages in
the occupation of procuring, offering, promising, or attempting to procure
employment or engagements for an artist or artists.”85 It does not expressly
include or exclude from the definition any professionals otherwise licensed
in the state such as attorneys, sports agents, insurance agents, real estate
agents, stock brokers, etc. Whether a person is a talent agent is not dependent
on his or her title, but whether their activities fall under the “procurement”
rubric set forth in the statute itself. However, the statute is painfully silent on
whether attorneys are talent agents. The Talent Agencies Act also fails to
define in its plain language just what constitutes “procuring, offering,
promising, or attempting to procure” employment or engagements. Simply,
the black-letter of the statute is silent as to whether attorneys’ activities
negotiating employment and engagement contracts for their clients in the
entertainment industries constitutes “procurement” that is subject to the
Talent Agencies Act.86
Fortunately, the legislature provides a roadmap for how to interpret this
silence. That roadmap is a similar statute which regulates agents in a similar
industry: California’s Miller-Ayala Athlete Agents Act.87 Prior to enactment
of the Miller-Ayala Act, the athlete agent law in California’s Business and
Professions Code did not address whether attorneys engaged in contract
negotiations on behalf of athletes were subject to the licensing and regulatory
requirements of the athlete agent law. “Rather, agent-attorneys were
regulated [solely] by rules of ethics set forth by the California State Bar
Association.”88 But in 1996, the state legislature decided to end its silence on
the matter. The Miller-Ayala Act expressly and unambiguously amended the
Business and Professions Code to subject attorneys to the licensing and
regulatory requirements of the athlete agent laws. This change required
attorneys to become dually licensed to negotiate on behalf of their athlete
clients.

85. Cal. Lab. Code § 1700.4.
86. Gary E. Devlin, Comment, The Talent Agencies Act: Reconciling the Controversies
Surrounding Lawyers, Managers, and Agents Participating in California’s Entertainment
Industry, 28 PEPP. L. REV. 381, 383 (2001) (“Notably, the [Talent Agencies] Act does not
expressly mention the applicability of the Act toward lawyers”).
87. 1996 Cal. Stats 4568, Ch. 857, § 2 (Cal. 1996), codified Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §
18895.2 et seq. (Deering 2020).
88. Robert P. Baker, The Unintended Consequence of the Miller-Ayala Athlete Agents
Act: Depriving Student Athletes of Effective Legal Representation, 12 UCLA ENT. L. REV.
267, 270 (2005) (“One of the major changes to the new law was to subject attorneys to
regulation”); James Malone & Daren Lipinsky, Comment, The Game Behind The Games:
Unscrupulous Agents in College Athletics & California’s Miller-Ayala Act, 17 LOY. L.A. ENT.
L.J. 413, 415 (1997) (citing Cal. Lab. Code §§ 1511, 1519 and 1547 (West 1989)).
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Using remarkably similar language to the Talent Agencies Act, the
Miller-Ayala Act defines an “athlete agent” not by a person’s title but by the
activities in which he or she is engaged. Section 18895.2(b)(1) of the
Business and Professions Code defines an athlete agent as “any person who,
directly or indirectly, . . . procures, offers, promises, attempts or negotiates
to obtain employment for any person with a professional sports team.”89 This
language tracks with Section 1700.4(a) of the Labor Code which defines a
talent agent as “a person . . . who engages in the occupation of procuring,
promising, or attempting to procure employment or engagement for an
artist.”90 Further distinguishing the black letter law of the Talent Agencies
Act from the Miller-Ayala Act is the express inclusion of attorneys engaged
in negotiation of employment agreements on behalf of their athlete clients in
the definition of “athlete agents” under Miller-Ayala. Section
18875.2(b)(2)(A) of the Miller-Ayala Act expressly defines the term “athlete
agent” to include any “person licensed as an attorney . . . to the extent that
the [attorney] also . . . for compensation procures, offers, promises, attempts,
or negotiates to obtain employment for any person with a professional sports
team.”91 The Miller-Ayala Act is express and unequivocal: licensed
attorneys must be secondarily-licensed as athlete agents to negotiate or
procure employment for athletes in California. Conversely, the plain, facial
language of the Talent Agencies Act remains silent on the issue.
Contrast the loud legislative expression and lack of ambiguity in the
Miller-Ayala Act with the deafening legislative silence in the Talent
Agencies Act. The Miller-Ayala Act presents a clear means of interpreting
this legislative silence. Prior to, and but for, the California legislature’s clear
intent to speak through the Miller-Ayala Act, California permitted attorneys
to do anything and everything that athlete agents were permitted to do. The
Miller-Ayala Act clearly and expressly ended that silence. And just as the
legislative silence prior to the Miller-Ayala Act was held to empower
attorneys, so must the same silence in the Talent Agencies Act today be
interpreted. A statute may expressly and unambiguously prohibit attorneys
from engaging in conduct that otherwise would constitute the practice of law.
But if it does not, then such silence must be interpreted to permit them to do
so even though such activities also constitute unlicensed procurement.
A second black-letter distinction exists. The plain language of the
Miller-Ayala Act clearly treats “procurement” activities as separate and
distinct from “negotiation” activities. As Section 18895.2(b)(2)(A) states, an
athlete-agent is one who “procures . . . or negotiates” employment or
engagements on behalf of professional athletes. The key language in the
statute is “or negotiates.” This language clearly implies an athlete-agent may
89.
90.
91.

Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 18895.2(b)(1).
Cal. Lab. Code § 1700.4(a).
Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 18895.2(b)(2)(A).
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engage in procurement or negotiation without necessarily engaging in the
other. Therefore, negotiation is not per se procurement. Compare this to the
Talent Agencies Act, which merely brings under its regulation only
procurement activities. Whereas the California legislature clearly decided in
an analogous regulatory scheme that procurement and negotiation are not the
same thing, the Labor Commission apparently thought itself the better arbiter
of the matter in Solis when it decided that negotiation necessarily constitutes
per se procurement. The plain language of the Talent Agencies Act lacks two
important elements found in the Miller-Ayala Act: an express inclusion of
attorneys in the definition of “talent agencies,” and a solid line distinguishing
procurement from negotiation. Therefore, what can be surmised from the
plain language of the TAA is (i) that the state legislature never intended
attorneys to be included in the definition of talent agents when the practice
of law also constitutes procurement; and (ii) the negotiation of contracts does
not constitute procurement of employment, and so an attorney’s negotiation
of a writer’s contract does not constitute procurement; and for that reason
cannot violate the Talent Agencies Act.
In coming to this better-reasoned conclusion, it is as important to
consider both the plain language of the statutes and the legislative processes
during the 1996-1997 session of the state legislature that led to passage of
the Miller-Ayala Athlete Agents Act.92 Not only does the Miller-Ayala Act
expressly include attorneys, but it also expressly excludes talent agents “as
defined in subdivision (a) of Section 1700.4” of the Talent Agencies Act.93
In other words, the state legislature was unambiguously considering the role
and relationship of not two types of representatives, but three types of
representatives: attorneys, sports agents, and talent agents. In addition to
enacting the Miller-Ayala Act, the legislature in the same session also
expressly amended the State Bar Act specifically to conform to the MillerAyala Act.94 As codified today, the State Bar Act states explicitly that “[i]t
shall constitute cause for the imposition of discipline of an attorney . . . for
an attorney to violate any provision of the Miller-Ayala Athlete Agents
Act.”95 Nothing in the legislative record suggests that the state legislature
attempted to amend the State Bar Act in 1996 to reflect an intent that
attorneys would be subject to the Talent Agencies Act. And nothing in the
92. Miller-Ayala Act, A.B. 1987, 1996-1997 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1996); see also 1996
Cal. Stats 4568, Ch. 857 at § 2.
93. Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 18895.2(b)(2)(C).
94. Miller-Ayala Athlete Agents Act, A.B. 1987, 1996-1997 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal.
1996), enacted 1996 Cal. Stats. 4568, Ch. 857 (Cal. 1996); An act to amend Section 6106.7
of, and to add Sections 18897.27, 18897.8, and 18897.9 to, the Business and Professions
Code, relating to athlete agents, S.B. 1401, 1996-1997 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1996)
[hereinafter Miller-Ayala State Bar Act Amendment], enacted 1996 Cal. Stats. 4577, Ch. 858
(Cal. 1996).
95. Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 6106.7 (Deering 2020).
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legislative record in 1978 or 1986 suggests the state legislature attempted to
amend the State Bar Act in either of those years to do the same, even though
the legislature clearly demonstrates its understanding that it could have, visà-vis its adoption of the Miller-Ayala Act.
Simply put, the California legislature has attempted no analogous
Miller-Ayala Act provision in the State Bar Act in connection with the Talent
Agencies Act. In context, then, it can be presumed that the legislature likely
considered and rejected an express policy making attorneys subject to the
Talent Agencies Act. At the very least, it is not unreasonable to find from
the plain language of the statute that, in context, the California legislature
never intended attorneys to be subject to regulation under the Talent
Agencies Act.
D. The legislative history of the Talent Agencies Act does not
demonstrate a legislative intent to prohibit licensed attorneys from
negotiating employment or engagement agreements on behalf of their
entertainment clients
As the worldwide leader in entertainment, California has long had an
interest in regulating the industry to protect workers’ welfare, including
regulation of artists’ representatives.96 The state’s legislative history
regulating talent agents and artist managers extends back more than a
century. And as important as what is in that history is what is wholly absent
from it. Through every statutory scheme enacted since 1913 relating to talent
representation, the exclusive focus of the California legislature has always
been on (i) the licensing and regulation of employment agents in the
entertainment industries, and (ii) the relationship between the job functions
of agents and managers. But never in the journals of the legislature is there
an indication that the state legislature considered – let alone intended – that
attorneys would be or should be subject to licensing and regulation
thereunder.
1. Private Employment Agencies Law of 1913
In the earliest part of the twentieth century, California had not yet
codified statutes by general subject matters as it does today, for example,
through the modern-day Labor Code and the Business and Professions

96. James M. O’Brian III, Comment, Regulation of Attorneys Under California’s Talent
Agencies Act: A Tautological Approach to Protecting Artists, 80 CALIF. L. REV. 471, 484, n.
8 (1992).

2021

LITIGATORS AND DEALMAKERS

25

Code.97 Instead, state statutes could be codified into one of four general legal
codes: the Penal Code, the Civil Code, the Code of Civil Procedure, and the
Political Code.98 However, a significant number of legislative enactments
did not fit into any of the above. Such orphan legislation was simply left
uncodified in the California Statutes.
In 1903, California passed an act “defining the duties and liabilities of
employment agents” generally that merely limited commissions to ten
percent.99 To the extent that talent agents were merely employment agents
who specialized in finding clients jobs in entertainment, this was the first
piece of California legislation arguably implicating the conduct of talent
agents. But it was another ten years before California enacted legislation
specifically regulating employment agencies in the entertainment industries.
In 1913, California passed the Private Employment Agencies Law.100
(herein, the “PEAL”). Uncodified and left in the general California Statutes,
this new law highly regulated all forms of “employment agency,” including
licensure requirements and delegation to the state Labor Commission.
The PEAL merely applied ancient agency law. Importantly, though, it
specifically defined and brought within its ambit all “theatrical employment
agenc[ies].”101 And for the first time, entertainment agencies were
specifically subject to substantive regulation. The PEAL required all
theatrical agents, as part of the licensing process, to include a statement
amounting to a background check prior to licensure, and to submit to the
labor Commission all forms of contracts to be used.102 However, the broader
licensing requirements and regulations of the PEAL applied not just to
theatrical employment agents, but also to all “intelligence office[s], domestic
and commercial employment agenc[ies], . . . teachers’ employment
agenc[ies], general employment bureau[s], shipping agenc[ies], nurses’
registr[ies], [and] any other agenc[ies] or office[s] for the purpose of
procuring or attempting to procure help or employment or engagements for
persons employment or engagements.”103 Conspicuously absent from the
97. These subject-matter codes would not be established until 1937. See infra, at 34-35;
see also 1937 Cal. Stats. 230, Ch. 90. (Cal. 1937) (establishing Cal. Lab. Code); 1937 Cal.
Stats. 1230, Ch. 399 (Cal. 1937) (establishing Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code).
98. Daniel W. Martin, Henke’s California Law Guide, 8th ed., at 45-67 (2006); see also
LLMC Digital, Description and Holding Information, 1874, California Penal Code, Annot.,
http://www.llmc.com/titledescfull.aspx?type=6&coll=8&div=29&set=99992 (last visited
July 23, 2020); Cal. Penal Code Ann. (Haymond & Burch 1874); Cal. Civ. Code Ann.
(Haymond & Burch 1874); Cal. Civ. Code Ann. (Haymond & Burch 1874); Cal. Code. Civ.
P. Ann. (Haymond & Burch 1874).
99. Ex parte Dickey, 144 Cal. 234, 234-35 (1904) (declaring a 1903 statute
unconstitutional which placed limitations on commissions).
100. 1913 Cal. Stats. 515, Ch. 282 (Cal. 1913) [hereinafter PEAL].
101. Id. at 515 (§§ 1.3, 1.4).
102. Id. at 520-521 (§§ 15, 16).
103. Id. at 515 (§ 1.2).
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PEAL, however, was any mention of attorneys. The state regulated attorney
conduct long prior to the PEAL enactments, going back to the nineteenth
century.104 But there is no indication in the PEAL provisions themselves as
passed, or the draft bill language of the PEAL enactments that the California
state legislature in 1913 intended or even considered the new law’s
application to attorneys.105
2. The California Labor Code of 1937
In the ensuing years, three occurrences happened pertinent to the
legislative history of the Talent Agencies Act as it relates to attorneys. First,
in 1927, California enacted the State Bar Act for the licensure and regulation
of attorneys;106 a statute that preempts the field of attorney regulation when
the practice of law is implicated.107 Second, in 1929, the legislature
established the California Code Commission as a permanent government
agency to sweepingly and permanently codify the California Statutes, then
described as existing “in a deplorable condition” and “the worst statutory law
in the country.”108 Third, in 1937, California enacted the first state Labor
Code.109 Through this enactment, the state legislature adopted as Part 6 of
the new Labor Code the previously-uncodified PEAL, including all
provisions specific to the licensure and regulation of theatrical agents.110
Simultaneously with enactment of the new Labor Code, California
modified the PEAL provisions of the new Labor Code (i.e., Part 6) to reflect
California’s then-infant motion picture industry. Specifically, the legislature
included in Part 6 of the new Labor Code yet another classification of general
employment agent: “motion picture employment agencies.”111 The new
California Labor Code now included in the definition of general
104. See Ex parte Yale, 24 Cal. 241, 242 (1864) (“an attorney of this Court, having been
admitted as an attorney and counsellor of this Court since its organization under the
Constitution of the State . . . and otherwise conformed to the rules of this Court as an
attorney”).
105. Cal. S.B. 1413, 1912-1913 Leg., 40th Sess. (Cal. 1913) (intro’d Cal. Senate J., 40th
Sess. at 496 (Feb. 3, 1913), amended id. at 669 (Mar. 22, 1913), amended id. at 1077 (Apr. 5,
1913), enrolled id. at 3038 (May 12, 1913)).
106. In re Attorney Discipline System, 19 Cal.4th 582, 590 (1998).
107. Baron v. City of Los Angeles, 2 Cal.3d 535, 543 (1970) (“the State Bar Act preempts
the field of regulation of attorneys only insofar as they are ‘practicing law’ under the act—i.e,
performing services in a representative capacity in a manner which would constitute the
unauthorized practice of law if performed by a layman”).
108. Nathan M. Crystal, Article, Codification and the Rise of the Restatement Movement,
54 WASH. L. REV. 239, 260 (1979).
109. 1937 Cal. Stats. 185, Ch. 90 (“An act to establish a Labor Code, thereby
consolidating and revising the law relating to labor and employment relations”) [hereinafter
AML].
110. Id. at 230, Part 6 (codifying Cal. Lab. Code §§ 1550 et seq.).
111. Id. (Cal. Lab. Code § 1552(b)).
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“employment agencies” two categories pertinent to the entertainment
industries: theatrical employment agencies and motion picture employment
agencies.112 But the practical effect was no effect at all. Theatrical
employment agencies would continue to be regulated in accordance with the
PEAL, though now codified in the new Labor Code. And motion picture
employment agencies would also now be licensed and regulated pursuant to
those same provisions of the same Labor Code. Importantly, however,
nothing in Part 6 of the new Labor Code included attorneys as “employment
agencies.” In fact, the State Bar Act never existed under the Labor Code at
all, but instead was codified in 1939 under the Business and Professions
Code where it remains to this day – wholly separate from talent agency
regulation.113 And neither did the legislature amend the then-new Labor
Code nor the State Bar Act to authorize or prohibit licensed attorneys from
procuring or negotiating employment or engagement contracts on behalf of
artists.
3. 1943 Artists’ Managers Law
By World War II, the entertainment business was changing rapidly. In
addition to attorneys and employment agents, entertainers increasingly were
reliant on a third member of their professional team: the personal manager.
And so, in 1943, the state legislature passed the Artists’ Managers Law
(“AML”), amending the Labor Code to add a separate statutory scheme
licensing and regulating “artists’ managers.”114 This new statutory scheme
existed in the same chapter, yet still separate from the PEAL provisions of
the Labor Code which continued to regulate talent agents.
Defined as “a person who engages in the occupation of advising,
counseling, or directing artists in the development or advancement of their
professional careers,”115 managers were separately licensed and regulated.
California law did not treat agents and managers as interchangeable. Noting
the difference in job duties, i.e., that agents procured employment for artists
while managers advised and counseled them, the AML amendment to the
Labor Code required a separate license for each job, and permitted people to
“apply for both an employment agency license and an artists’ manager
license.”116 In other words, holding one license did not confer privileges on
the licensee to engage in the other occupation.
112. Id. (Cal. Lab. Code §§ 1551(a), 1552(a)).
113. See Elsey Hurt, California State Government: An Outline of Its Administrative
Organization v.2: The Independent Agencies, 1850-1939, Bureau of Pub. Admin., Univ. of
Cal. at 133 (1939).
114. 1943 Cal. Stats. 1326, Ch. 329 (Cal. 1943) (codifying Cal. Lab. Code §§ 1650 et
seq.) [hereinafter AML Amts.].
115. Id. at 1326, § 1.
116. Id. at 1327, § 4 (Cal. Lab. Code § 1653).
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One important aspect of the AML amendments to the Labor Code is the
residual language that appears in the modern day Talent Agencies Act. At
that time, the state legislature included a safe harbor for talent managers who
might otherwise run afoul of the PEAL’s employment agencies regulations.
Referred to as the “incidental procurement” provision of the AML provisions
of the Labor Code, this section permitted artists’ managers to procure
employment and engagements on behalf of artists, but “only in connection
with and as a part of the duties and obligations of such person under a
contract with such artist by which such person contracts to render services”
of an artists’ manager.117 It is in this incidental procurement provision of the
1943 AML amendments to the Labor Code that the language first appears on
which the Labor Commission relied in the Solis decision, supra.
In 1943, the state legislature expressly mandated that a person be
subject to dual-licensure in order to procure employment as an agent and
separately to counsel artists as a manager. However, the AML amendments
to the Labor Code remained conspicuously silent on the application of the
Labor Code to attorneys. None of the prior drafts of the AML amendments
suggest the legislature contemplated or intended the Labor Code to require
the dual or even triple-licensure for persons wishing to counsel clients as
managers, procure employment as agents and negotiate employment
contracts as attorneys. Nor did it amend the State Bar Act at that time to
prohibit licensed attorneys from either counseling, negotiating for, or
otherwise generally representing their Hollywood clientele. The AML drafts,
the final form of the Labor Code, and the State Bar Act remained wholly
silent on the matter.
4. Artist Managers Act of 1959
In 1959, the legislature again amended the Labor Code, this time by
enacting the Artist Managers Act (AMA). On its face, the AMA merely
rearranged the Labor Code as it related to regulation of managers. In 1943,
Chapter 1 of Part 6 of the Labor Code was still, in essence, merely the PEAL.
Chapter 1 regulated all private employment agencies, including all theatrical
employment agencies and motion picture employment agencies. And the
1943 AML amendments merely added the artists’ manager provisions to
Chapter 1 as sub-chapters relating to all employment agencies. But the 1959
117. AML Amts. at 1326, § 1 (Cal. Lab. Code § 1650). A similar law is still on the books
in New York. N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 171(8); also Myles L. Gutenkunst, Note, Talent
Managers Acting as Agents Revisited: An Argument for California’s Imperfect Talent
Agencies Act, 37 HASTINGS COMM. & ENTM’T. L.J. 113, 114-115 (2015) (“New York
Employment Agency Law shares similar common law roots and statutory provisions but with
one major exception: incidental booking. A New York talent manager may procure
employment for the artist where the procurement is incidental to the normal management
duties for the artist”).
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AMA did something that no prior artist representative legislation had done.
It removed all of the artists’ manager provisions from Chapter 1 of the Labor
Code, and recodified them to Chapter 4.118
At first glance, this appears to be merely legislative housekeeping.
However, by re-codifying talent manager regulations separately from
employment agency regulations, i.e., from theatrical agent and motion
picture agent regulations, the state legislature signaled its “increased
realization that ‘the business of procuring employment in the entertainment
industry . . . is different and in many ways more complex than the business
of the normal employment agencies the Labor Commission regulates.’”119
The 1959 AMA retained the incidental procurement language in Section
1700.4 of the Labor Code, and thus the AMA provisions of the Labor Code
became the truest progenitor of the Talent Agencies Act as it exists today.
Nothing in Chapter 1 or Chapter 4 of the Labor Code expressly or
impliedly suggested an intent to regulate attorneys under any section of those
chapters of the Labor Code. The legislature did not amend the State Bar Act
to prohibit attorneys from negotiating artists’ contracts. Nor did the
legislature amend the State Bar Act to subject attorneys to licensure or
regulation under the Labor Code instead of the State Bar Act.
5. Employment Agency Act of 1967
In 1967, the state legislature wholly separated talent agents and artists’
managers statutorily. With passage of the Employment Agency Act of 1967,
the California legislature finally created total statutory distinction between
laws regulating talent agents and laws regulating artists’ managers. The act
repealed the Labor Code’s PEAL provisions and re-codified them in the
Business and Professions Code.120 Meanwhile, artists’ managers would
continue to be regulated by the Labor Code.121 Additionally, and for the first
time, the PEAL permanently removed from its definition of “employment
agency” the sub-classifications of theatrical employment agencies and
motion picture employment agencies.
Instead, talent agencies presumably were intended to be regulated by
the Business and Professions Code by virtue of meeting the broader
definition of an “employment agency” under the 1967 act, as “any . . .
118. 1959 Cal. Stats. 2920, Ch. 888, § 1 (Cal. 1959)(“Chapter 4 (commencing at Section
1700) is added to Part 6, Division 2 of the Labor Code”)[hereinafter AMA].
119. O’Brian, supra note 96, at 494 (quoting Philip R. Green & Beverly R. Green, Talent
Agents and the New California Act, 1988 ENTM’T., PUBLISHING AND THE ARTS HANDBOOK
357, John D. Viera & Robert Thorne eds. (1988)).
120. 1967 Cal. Stats. 3557, Ch. 1505, §§ 1,2 (1967)[hereinafter AMA Amts.].
121. AMA Amts. at 3557, § 1 (codified in Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 9914 [later repealed])
(“Nothing in this chapter shall apply to an artists’ manager, as defined or licensed under
Chapter 4 (commencing with Section 1700) of Part 6 of Division 2 of the Labor Code”).
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business . . . which procures, offers, promises or attempts to procure
employment or engagements for others.”122 Furthermore, no prior talent
agency (i.e., theatrical employment agencies or motion picture employment
agencies) received special treatment as they had before. Talent agents,
theatrical employment agents, and motion picture employment agents were
simply “employment agents” under the Business and Professions Code;123
while artists’ managers were simply “artists’ managers” under the Labor
Code. However, nowhere in the 1967 Employment Agency Law did the state
legislature amend either the Business and Professions Code or the Labor
Code to bring licensed attorneys under their regulatory authority. Nor did the
legislature amend the State Bar Act.
6. Talent Agencies Act of 1978
Finally, in 1978, the state legislature enacted what would become the
modern-day Talent Agencies Act. The most significant change was that, for
the first time, talent agents were no longer subject to the general agency
licensing requirements and regulations of the PEAL’s successor statutes.
Instead, regulation of talent agents returned to the Labor Code. Once again,
and permanently, talent agents would be treated differently and specially
from general employment agents. The means by which this was achieved
was the de-regulation of artists’ managers combined with stricter regulation
of talent agents, all by changing two simple words. The Talent Agencies Act
amended Section 1700.4 of the Labor Code to define a talent agency as “a
person or corporation who engages in the occupation of procuring, offering,
promising, or attempting to procure employment or engagements for an artist
or artists.”124 Effectively, the amendment merely changed the term “artists’
manager” as used in Chapter 4 of the Labor Code to “talent agent.” With this
simple stroke of a pen, the job of a talent manager in California became
unlicensed and unregulated.
However, the 1978 TAA also changed the relationship between agents
and managers. First, it permitted talent agents to “counsel or direct artists in
the development of their professional careers.”125 This immediately deregulated what formerly was a licensed profession, i.e., the counseling and
directing of artists, and made it more competitive as managers now had to
compete with talent agents who were permitted to engage in the same
122. Id. (codified at Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 9902(a) [later repealed]).
123. It is worth noting that the PEAL is still in force today, having been re-codified from
the Business and Professions Code to the Civil Code by the Employment Agency,
Employment Counseling, and Job Listing Services Act of 1989. 1989 Cal. Stats. 2304, Ch.
704, §§ 1,2 (Cal. 1989).
124. 1978 Cal. Stats. 4575, Ch. 1381, § 6 (Cal. 1978) (amending Cal. Lab. Code § 1700.4)
[hereinafter TAA].
125. Id. (amending Cal. Lab. Code § 1700.4).

2021

LITIGATORS AND DEALMAKERS

31

conduct. The 1978 TAA also repealed the incidental procurement provision
that previously had been a safe harbor for talent managers.126 While
managers were no longer required to obtain a license “to counsel or direct
artists in the development of their professional careers,”127 they also were no
longer permitted to engage in procurement activities unless they were
licensed under the Talent Agencies Act provisions of the Labor Code.128
But most importantly, and once again, the state legislature found itself
concerned exclusively with regulation of talent agents and managers. In the
greatest seismic shift in the licensing and regulation of artists’
representatives in state history, absolutely nothing in the legislative history
from the 1977-1978 session suggests the legislature considered - let alone
intended - that the TAA would regulate attorneys under the Labor Code
instead of the State Bar Act. No committee report and no draft bill ever
implies such consideration or intent. Furthermore, what is indisputable is that
while amending the Labor Code through the Talent Agencies Act, the
California legislature wholly failed to amend the State Bar Act provisions of
the Business and Professions Code to reflect such changes.
7. 1985 California Entertainment Commission Report
In 1982, the state legislature formed the California Entertainment
Commission to “study the laws and practices of [California], the State of
New York, and other entertainment capitals of the United States relating to
the licensing of agents and representatives of artists in the entertainment
industry.”129 The commission’s ultimate objective was to “recommend to the
Legislature a model bill regarding this licensing” and regulatory scheme.130
In 1985, the Entertainment Commission published its findings.131 And while
the Entertainment Commission’s purview included representation across all
the entertainment industries, ultimately the state legislature enacted
amendments to the Talent Agencies Act in 1986 specific only to the music
and recording industry.132 These were the last major amendments to the
Talent Agencies Act.

126. See AMA, supra at note 119 (adding Cal. Lab. Code § 1700.4); contrast TAA, supra
at note125 (amending Cal. Lab. Code § 1700.4).
127. TAA at § 7 (Cal. Lab. Code § 1700.5).
128. Id.
129. 1982 Cal. Stats. 2816, Ch. 682, art. 4 (Cal. 1982) (Cal. Lab. Code §§ 1701, 1702)
[hereinafter 1982 TAA Amts.].
130. Id. (Cal. Lab. Code § 1701).
131. Cal. Entm’t. Comm’n., Rep. of the Cal. Entm’t. Comm’n (1985) https://www.dir.ca.
gov/dlse/TAC/California%20Entertainment%20Commission%20Report%20-%201985.pdf.
132. 1986 Cal. Stats. 1804, Ch. 488, § 2 (amending Cal. Lab. Code to re-create incidental
procurement provision in Section 1700.4 for people engaged in “procuring . . . recording
contracts for an artist”) [hereinafter 1986 TAA Amts.].
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It is important to note for purposes of examining the legislative history
of the TAA that while the legislature’s ultimate amendments were quite
limited in scope, they were broadly considering the TAA’s application across
all sectors of the entertainment industry. As important is a critique of the
statutory make-up of the Entertainment Commission itself. The commission
was statutorily comprised of three licensed talent agents, three personal
managers, and three artists to the commission. The California Labor
Commission would sit as the tenth member of the commission.133
Conspicuously absent, however, was a representative of the entertainment
bar who could speak for the third branch of artist representation:
entertainment lawyers. Attorneys had no voice on the commission.
But furthermore, the commission itself voiced no opinion on
application of the TAA (or its corollary in other states) to duly-licensed
attorneys. Fascinatingly, the 39-page report focuses exclusively on the
relationships between artists and their agents and managers. The word
“agent” or “agency” is mentioned 34 times (not including its use in quoted
statutory language). The word “manager” is mentioned 30 times. But the
number of times the commission mentioned “attorneys” or “lawyers?” Zero.
The closest the commission ever came to implying that attorneys ought to be
regulated under the Labor Code instead of the State Bar Act was through the
use of collective, ambiguous phrases such as “or anyone” or “anyone other
than a licensed Talent Agent.”134 The commission attached a five-page
summary at the end of its report titled Summary of Legislation Preceding the
Talent Agencies Act.135 Therein, the commission focused exclusively on the
state’s licensing and regulation of artist agents arising out of artists’ concerns
regarding artist managers. However, at no point therein did the commission
suggest that artists’ concerns regarding attorneys were also the subject of the
commission’s research. The clear purpose of the Act was always to protect
artists from unscrupulous talent agents and unscrupulous artist managers –
not to create a legal monopoly for talent agents. Other commentators have
noted the deficiency of the Entertainment Commission’s processes and
findings.136 While the last amendments pertained only to the recording
industry, the important consideration is that yet again the California
legislature ignored the attorneys.
8. Summary
133. 1982 TAA Amts. at 2816, Ch. 682, § 6 (Cal. Lab. Code § 1701).
134. Cal. Entm’t. Comm’n., supra note 131, at 7, 11.
135. Id. at 35-39.
136. See, e.g., Bradley W. Hertz, The Regulation of Artist Representation in the
Entertainment Industry, 8 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 55, 68 (1988) (“It seems that the California
Entertainment Commission abdicated its responsibility on the very issue that it was charged
to resolve. The problem will not go away simply because the Commission has reaffirmed the
current law”).
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Simply put, the state assembly never in the eleven decades since
enactment of the PEAL considered or intended any of its artist representation
legislation to claw attorneys into the fold. The state assembly has authority
to statutorily require attorneys to be dually-licensed to engage in certain
defined agencies. This much is clear from the fact that the state legislature
clearly and unambiguously exercised such authority when it passed the
Miller-Ayala Act and amended the State Bar Act to reflect those
amendments. But absolutely nothing exists in the century-long legislative
history of the Talent Agencies Act suggesting the legislature intended
attorneys to be subject to the licensing and regulatory requirements generally
imposed on talent agents. Never did any of these legislative acts
simultaneously amend the State Bar Act or the Rules of Professional
Conduct to reflect such an intent. Nor has any California state court ever
ruled on the issue.
Instead, the only authority suggesting as much are a scant number of
decisions by the California Labor Commission which rely on overly
simplistic logic and unlawful statutory construction with no regard,
discussion or consideration of the actual legislative intent behind the Talent
Agencies Act, supra. While “[t]he construction of a statute by an agency
charged with its administration is entitled to great weight,” such
constructions are hardly dispositive. Furthermore, to the extent an
administrative agency engages in statutory construction, it must adhere to
actual principles of statutory construction and an informed, detailed
examination of legislative intent, such as that set forth above and herein.137
The Labor Commission utterly failed to consider statutory construction
principles or the legislative history and intent of the Talent Agencies Act.

IV. The Solis Decision Creates Irreconcilable Statutory Conflicts
Between the Talent Agencies Act and the State Bar Act
A. The Talent Agencies Act’s application to licensed attorneys will be a
matter of first impression in the California state courts
As noted, the Talent Agencies Act confers on the California Labor
Commission original jurisdiction of claims arising from violations of the
statute.138 However, all decisions of the Labor Commission are “subject to
an appeal within 10 days after determination, to the superior court where the
same shall be heard de novo.”139 While the TAA was enacted in 1978, the
137.
1995).
138.
139.

See Waisbren v. Peppercorn Prods., Inc., 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d 437, 442 (Cal. Ct. App.
CAL. LAB. CODE § 1700.44.
Id. at § 1700.44(a).
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Labor Commission did not hear a case against a California-licensed attorney
in which “practice of law” was asserted as a defense until 2013, when the
Labor Commission rendered its decision in Solis v. Blancarte.
The only other case in which “practice of law” by a California-licensed
attorney was asserted as a defense was Doughty v. Hess.140 However, neither
Solis nor Doughty was appealed to the California district court. Of the 46
cases in which the district court took appeals from Labor Commission
decisions, none of them defined the statute’s phrase “procurement,” let alone
held that negotiation constitutes per se procurement. Nor did any of them
examine whether the Talent Agencies Act is so broad as to prohibit dulylicensed California attorneys from negotiating entertainment employment
contracts; i.e., practicing law. Therefore, application of the Talent Agencies
Act to duly-licensed attorneys in California remains a question-of-firstimpression before the California state courts. And no California court is
constrained by any binding precedent.
B. The Labor Commission’s Solis decision creates an absurd result
opening both attorneys and talent agents to liability under California law
Contract negotiation and drafting has long been deemed the “practice
of law” in California. In 1998, the California Supreme Court established
unequivocally in Birbrower, Montalbano, Condon & Frank, P.C. v. Superior
Court that the practice of law in California includes giving “legal advice and
legal instrument and contract preparation, whether or not these subjects were
rendered in the course of litigation.”141 The Birbrower Court considered
whether a New York law firm’s activities within the State of California
constituted the unlicensed practice of law within the state. Defendant law
firm Birbrower was engaged by a California corporation, ESQ, to provide
legal services in connection with litigation against ESQ by Tandem
Computers Incorporated. In the course of providing legal services, one of
Birbrower’s attorneys, Kevin Hobbs, “returned to California to assist ESQ
in settling the Tandem matter. While in California, . . . Hobbs also met with
Tandem representatives to discuss possible changes in [a] proposed
agreement.”142 It should come as no surprise that there is exactly one phrase

140. TAC 39547 (Cal. Lab. Comm’r., April 4, 2017), https://www.dir.ca.gov/dlse/TAC/
TAC-39547%20Doughty%20v.%20Hess%20040517.pdf; see Lab. Comm’r.’s Office,
DLSE-Talent Agency Cases, State of Cal., Dep’t. of Ind. Relations, https://www.dir.ca.
gov/dlse/DLSE-TACs.htm (last viewed Mar. 20, 2020)(the author’s review of the Labor
Commissioner’s published Talent Agency Cases reveals only two cases since 1971 in which
the putative agent (i) was a licensed attorney (ii) asserting “practice of law” as a defense to a
violation of the Talent Agencies Act, to wit, Solis and Doughty).
141. 949 P.2d 1, 5 (Cal. 1998).
142. Id. at 3.
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defined by “discussing possible changes” to a “proposed agreement”:
contract negotiation.143
In 2001, the California Court of Appeals tied Birbrower to the
negotiation of film-related contracts in California. In Simons v. Steverson,
petitioner Shawn Simons was an independent film producer and California
resident. He engaged the New York law firm of Rudolph & Beer, LLP “to
perform certain legal services for” Simons related to a film he was
preparing.144 One of the attorneys at the firm, Mark Steverson, was a
California-licensed attorney who would be Simon’s actual attorney.145 The
services Steverson was engaged to perform “included, but were not limited
to . . . the negotiating and drafting of all agreements relating to financing and
production of the Picture, including but not limited to actors’ agreements,
location agreements, and crew agreements.”146 Relying on Birbrower, Simon
contended that Steverson’s actions constituted the practice of law in
California. The district court “disagreed that the act of negotiating qualified
as the practice of law.147 But the California Court of Appeals reversed the
district court. Citing Birbrower, the Simons Court held that Steverson had,
in fact, “provided legal services under California law,” by “review[ing],
negotiat[ing] and complet[ing] [an] . . . agreement.”148 Definitely, California
courts have long recognized that negotiating, preparing and drafting artist
agreements (i.e., “actors’ agreements . . . and crew agreements”) is within
the ambit of the “practice of law” in California.
On the other hand, the California Labor Commission holds in Solis that
negotiating, preparing and drafting artist agreements constitutes
“procurement” activities under the Act that are somehow distinct (in total)
from the attorneys’ full and robust scope of practice. The TAA specifically
grants original jurisdiction for disputes arising under the Act to the Labor
Commission.149 The Commission has long been given discretion to interpret
the Act.150 The Act specifically prohibits unlicensed people from “procuring,
offering, promising, or attempting to procure employment or engagements
for an artist or artists.”151 And the Labor Commission has long defined the
143. People v. Starski, 212 Cal. Rptr. 3d 622, 632 (Cal. Ct. App. 2017) (“‘As the term is
generally understood . . . in a larger sense it includes legal advice and counsel and the
preparation of legal instruments and contracts by which legal rights are secured although such
matter may or may not be depending in a court.’ Our Supreme Court has also repeatedly held
that purporting to represent someone, even if only impliedly, while negotiating a settlement
is likewise included within the practice of law”).
144. 106 Cal. Rptr. 2d 193, 197 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001).
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 203.
148. Id. at 208.
149. CAL. LAB. CODE. § 1700.44(a); also CAL. CODE REGS. § 12022.
150. See Waisbren, supra at 442.
151. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1700.44(b).
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phrase “procure,” as used in the Talent Agencies Act, to include “the acts
undertaken in the course of negotiating an agreement for the employment of
an artist.”152
Under Simons, the California Court of Appeals implicitly holds that
negotiation of actors’ and crew agreements constitutes the “practice of law.”
But under Solis, the California Labor Commission holds that negotiation of
actors’ and crew agreements constitutes “procurement.”153 In other words,
“the practice of law” constitutes “procurement,” and vice-versa. And both
unlicensed procurement and the unlicensed practice of law are respectively
prohibited by two different statutory schemes. Applying Solis, the Talent
Agencies Act prohibits attorneys from negotiating contracts for artists (i.e.,
“procuring”) without a talent agency license. Applying Simons, the State Bar
Act prohibits talent agents from negotiating contracts for artists (i.e.,
“practicing law”) without a law license.154 This creates unintended legal
dangers for both attorneys and talent agents.
If Solis is not rejected, both attorneys and talent agents face strong
sanction if not dually-licensed as both an attorney and a talent agent. Under
the Talent Agencies Act, the attorney is subject to simple administrative
penalties for unlicensed procurement. As occurred in Solis, the attorney’s
representation agreement could be invalidated and the attorney required to
disgorge any contingent or hourly fees received for legal services. But the
talent agent faces the greater prospect for sanction. Penalties for the
unlicensed practice of law under the State Bar Act subject the talent agent
not just to civil penalties, but also to criminal punishment. As set forth in
Section 6125 of the State Bar Act, “[a]ny person . . . practicing law who is
not an active licensee of the State Bar . . . is guilty of a misdemeanor
punishable by up to one year in a county jail or by a fine of up to one
thousand dollars ($1,000), or both that fine and imprisonment.”155
In 1967, the California Court of Appeals announced its decision in
Buchwald v. Superior Court, a case analyzing the Artists’ Managers Act (a
precursor to the Talent Agencies Act). The Buchwald Court explicitly held
that such absurdities arising from statutory construction must be avoided:
“Statutes must be given a reasonable and common sense construction in
accordance with the apparent purpose and intention of the lawmakers – one
that will lead to wise policy rather than to mischief or absurdity.”156 And it
has long been public policy in California that the State Bar Act preempts the
field in all matters involving the practice of law.157 Therefore, the Talent
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.

Solis, TAC-27089 at 6, 6.
CAL. LAB. CODE § 1700.44(b).
CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 6125(a).
Id. at § 6125(a).
62 Cal. Rptr. at 369.
Baron, 469 P.2d at 357.
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Agencies Act must be construed to recognize the public policy of the State
Bar Act’s supremacy and avoids the clear absurdity arising from a scenario
in which California law both empowers and sanctions attorneys and talent
agents for doing what the law purportedly empowers them to do. The only
way to avoid such absurdity is to reject the California Labor Commission’s
Solis interpretation of the Talent Agencies Act as to what does (and does not)
constitute “procurement” under the statute. Failing to do so creates additional
absurdities. First, to uphold the administrative court’s interpretation
effectively would overturn over fifty years of state supreme court
precedent.158 But more importantly, failing to reject Solis obviates a
legislative intent spanning more than one hundred years.
C. The State Bar Act and the California Rules of Professional Conduct
together constitute a separate-and-analogous licensing and regulatory
scheme sufficiently fulfilling the legislative purposes of the Talent
Agencies Act
The Talent Agencies Act itself is not the only regulatory mandate to
consider. In addition to the statute, the Labor Commission is empowered to
draft regulations for purposes of enforcing the statute. And the Labor
Commission has done just that, promulgating the General Rules and
Regulations for Artists’ Managers.159 Together, the Talent Agencies Act and
the General Rules constitute the regulatory and licensing scheme for talent
agents in California. However, California courts have suggested that similar
schemes may act as whole substitutes for the TAA statutory and regulatory
scheme.
In 1995, the California Court of Appeals published its decision in
Waisbren v. Peppercorn Productions. In that case, the putative agent at issue
was a talent manager. The appeals court found that “[u]nlike a talent agent,
a ‘personal manager’ is not covered by the [Talent Agencies] Act or any
other statutory licensing scheme.”160 In 2008, the California Supreme Court
published its decision in Marathon Entertainment, Inc. v. Blasi. The
Marathon Court described the regulatory scheme of the Talent Agencies Act
as the “requirements for how licensed talent agencies conduct their business,
including a code of conduct, submission of contracts and fee schedules to the
state, maintenance of a client trust account, posting of a bond, and
158. See Mickel v. Murphy, 305 P.2d 993, 995 (Cal. Ct. App. 1957) (quoting People v.
Sipper, 142 P.2d 960, 962-963 (Cal. Ct. App. 1943)) (“If defendant had only been called upon
to perform and had only undertaken to perform the clerical service of filling in the blanks on
a particular form in accordance with information furnished him by the parties,” as opposed to
negotiating the printed terms (i.e., negotiating the offered terms), . . . he would not have been
guilty of practicing law without a license”).
159. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1700.29; CAL. CODE REGS. §§12000 et seq.
160. Waisbren, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 440 (emphasis added).
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prohibitions against discrimination, kickbacks, and certain conflicts of
interest.”161 But interestingly, the Marathon Court made an additional
finding sua sponte. Citing the Waisbren decision, the Marathon Court stated
that “[n]o separate analogous licensing or regulatory scheme extends to
personal managers.”162
The clear implication of these cases is that if a case ever arose in which
a “separate analogous licensing or regulatory scheme” extends to a putative
talent agent, the Talent Agencies Act is not intended to require licensing or
to regulate such a person. California has at various times in its history
adopted and repealed laws and regulations targeting talent managers.
However, the state has consistently maintained a separate analogous
licensing and regulatory scheme for attorneys for nearly a century. That
scheme is the State Bar Act and the Rules of Professional Conduct.
In California, licensing and regulation of attorneys predates by decades
not just the Talent Agencies Act, but all legislative attempts at licensing and
regulation of talent agencies.163 In 1927, the state legislature adopted the
State Bar Act.164 And “[i]n 1966, the electorate adopted a provision placing
the State Bar in the judicial article of the state Constitution. Article VI,
section 9 of the California Constitution states: ‘The State Bar of California
is a public corporation. Every person admitted and licensed to practice law
in this State is and shall be a member of the State Bar.’”165 Today, the State
Bar Act is codified in the Business & Professions Code and consists of more
than 200 separate subsections.166 In addition to the substantive provisions of
the act itself, the State Bar Act also authorizes the California State Bar to
“formulate and enforce rules of professional conduct for all members of the
State Bar,” including suspension from practice for any willful breach of those
rules.167 It is fair to say that together, the State Bar Act and the California
Rules of Professional Conduct constitute a constitutionally required separate
licensing and regulatory scheme for attorneys, which is analogous to the
161. Marathon, 174 P.3d at 747.
162. Id. (citing Waisbren, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 440-441).
163. In re Application of Weymann, 268 P. 971, 971 (Cal. App. 1928) (“the subject of
admission to the practice of law in this state, including the procedure therefor, was governed
by the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure”); see In re Disbarment of Collins, 206 P.
990, 990 (Cal. 1922)(“The petitioner herein applies for an order vacating and setting aside a
former order of this court made on July 19, 1909, striking from the roll of attorneys and
counselors the name of said petitioner”); People v. Treadwell, 5 P. 686, 686 (Cal. 1885) (“This
is a proceeding for the removal of an attorney of this court, brought under Section 288, C. C.
P.”); Marathon, 174 P.3d at 746 (“The [Talent Agency] Act’s roots extend back to 1913,
when the Legislature passed the Private Employment Agencies Law and imposed the first
licensing requirements for employment agents”).
164. In re Attorney Discipline System, 967 P.2d 49, 67 (Cal. 1998).
165. Id. at 52.
166. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 6000-6243.
167. Id. at §§ 6076, 6077; also cf. Cal. R. Prof. Conduct 1.0(a).
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Talent Agencies Act and the General Rules and Regulations for Artists’
Managers as contemplated in Waisbren and Marathon.
Ultimately, the question becomes whether the State Bar Act and the
Talent Agencies Act are truly analogous. The first issue is whether the two
statutes share similar legislative purposes. There can be no doubt that the
State Bar Act and the Talent Agencies Act do so. While courts have
recognized that talent agents might otherwise face increased competition
from others who may engage in similar activity, they have unequivocally
held that the actual purpose of the Act is to protect artists.168 No court has
ever held that any legislative purpose of the Act is to statutorily create a
monopoly favoring talent agents. Similarly, the State Bar Act was enacted
for the protection of the public in general, including artists. As set forth
therein, “[p]rotection of the public shall be the highest priority for the State
Bar of California . . . in exercising [its] licensing, regulatory, and
disciplinary functions. Whenever the protection of the public is inconsistent
with other interests sought to be promoted, the protection of the public shall
be paramount.”169 More specifically, the purpose of the Act and its
regulations is to protect artists from “unscrupulous” talent agents.170
Meanwhile, the purpose of the State Bar Act and, more specifically, the
Rules of Professional Conduct, is to protect clients from unscrupulous
attorneys.171
The second issue is whether both schemes share similar licensing and
regulatory requirements to achieve these similar legislative goals. And there
can be no doubt that the State Bar Act provides similar means – if not
superior means – to achieve the legislature’s objectives. The first shared
168. Waisbren, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 441-442 (“‘Such statutes are enacted for the protection
of those seeking employment [i.e., the artists].’ . . . The position of the talent agents is that
anyone who performs the same function as they in procuring employment for an artist should
be subject to the same statutory and regulatory obligations as they are – nothing more and
nothing less. . . . Talent agents increasingly find themselves in competition with personal
managers and others in seeking employment for clients. In the opinion of the talent agents,
the issue is simply one of fairness: all who seek employment for an artist should be licensed
or none should be licensed”).
169. Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 6001.1.
170. Styne v. Stevens, 26 P.3d 343, 354 (Cal. 2001).
171. See Sharp v. Next Entm’t. Inc., 78 Cal. Rptr. 3d 37, 51(Cal. Ct. App. 2008) (“conflict
of interest rules are designed to ‘assure the attorney’s absolute and undivided loyalty and
commitment to the client and the protection of client confidences” [sic]); see Kirk v. First Am.
Title Ins. Co., 108 Cal. Rptr. 3d 620, 644 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010)(“Courts have recognized the
‘interest in preserving the continuity of the lawyer-client relationship; otherwise, if such
relationships were easily disrupted . . . the costs of litigation would be even higher, and
unscrupulous attorneys would have an incentive to seize on strained facts and theories”); see
Bird, Marella, Boxer & Wolpert v. Superior Court, 130 Cal. Rptr. 2d 782, 792 (Cal. Ct. App.
2003) (“If only ‘actually innocent’ clients can challenge their defense counsel’s excessive or
unlawful fees then ‘actually guilty’ clients could never seek redress against even the most
unscrupulous attorneys”).
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regulatory scheme is embodied in the respective licensing requirements
themselves.172 In order to obtain a license, both prospective talent agents and
attorneys must submit written applications to their respective licensing
authorities.173 Both regulatory schemes permit the regulating authority to
require applicants to submit to background checks into their criminal
history,174 (including submission of the applicant’s fingerprints),175 and their
character and moral fitness.176 Both talent agencies and law firms are subject
to annual reregistration requirements.177 Both talent agency licenses and law
licenses may be revoked or suspended by the regulating authority for failure
to comply with their respective statutes, for failures of moral character, and
for fraud or misrepresentation on an application for such a license.178 Both
regulating authorities have authority to conduct investigations into the
conduct of their respective licensees.179 Last, the Rules of Professional
Conduct provide for a similar contract cancellation remedy in the event of
their breach.180 Because the purpose of both statutory and regulatory schemes
is the same, and the statutory, regulatory and rules mechanisms between both
schemes is sufficiently similar, the State Bar Act/Rules of Professional
Conduct constitute the separate-but-analogous licensing scheme
contemplated by the Marathon and Waisbren courts.
In fact, the State Bar Act and Rules of Professional Conduct together
provide for a better and more efficient regulatory scheme to protect writers
and other Hollywood artists than the Talent Agencies Act ever will. Bear in
mind that the dispute between the ATA and the WGA came to a head
specifically because talent agents have long been engaged in conduct that
violates their fiduciary responsibilities to their clients – the writers.181 The
Talent Agencies Act does absolutely zero to protect writers from this type of

172. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1700.5; CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 6060,6125.
173. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1700.6; Cal. R. of Court R. 9.9.5 (to comply with Cal. Bus. &
Prof. Code § 6054); see also State Bar of California, Website, Fingerprinting Rule
Requirement FAQs, http://www.calbar.ca.gov/Attorneys/Attorney-Regulation/Fingerprint
ing-Rule-Requirements/Fingerprinting-FAQ (last viewed Mar. 6, 2020).
174. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1700.7; CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 6054.
175. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1700.6; CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 6054.
176. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1700.7; CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 6054, 6060, 6060.2.
177. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1700.10; CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 6161.1.
178. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1700.21; CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 6077; generally CAL. BUS.
& PROF. CODE 6075 et seq.
179. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 6043, 6044, 6060.2, 6168.
180. Sheppard, Mullin, Richter & Hampton, LLP v. J-M Mfg. Co., Inc., 425 P.3d 1, 9
(Cal. 2018) (“a contract or transaction involving attorneys may be declared unenforceable for
violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct”).
181. See generally Smith, supra note 25, at 193-221 (in-depth consideration of fiduciary
duties Hollywood talent agents owe their clients and conflicts arising therefrom in context of
packaging).
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agency conduct and has left a gaping hole permitting the proliferation of
packaging deals among Hollywood talent agents.
A major point of contention is that writers and other artists have
discovered the TAA acts not as a bulwark against unscrupulous talent
marketers, but instead is an entrée for predatory representatives. In 2015, the
Los Angeles Times printed an exposé series on scams in the entertainment
industry titled Selling Stardom. In one of those stories, multiple clients of
former talent agent Lynn Venturella complained of her predatory behavior.
According to the piece, Venturella was “one of the hundreds of talent agents
operating on the fringes of Hollywood, where the clients are mostly character
actors, fledgling screenwriters, workaday directors, even unknown
wannabes.”182 After becoming victims of embezzlement and other fraudulent
practices, “several past clients of Venturella said the fact that her agency was
state-licensed – and maintained a required $50,000 bond,” pursuant to the
Talent Agencies Act, “made them comfortable with signing” with her.183 The
absence of a comprehensive code and reporting infrastructure has only
emboldened licensed talent agents to engage in the abuses the Talent
Agencies Act was intended to halt. Attorneys, on the other hand, have always
been prevented from engaging in abuses the Talent Agencies Act and
General Rules fail to prevent.
The first major difference between the Talent Agencies Act scheme and
the State Bar Act scheme is that attorneys must successfully demonstrate
competence to practice law before being granted a license, whereas talent
agents do not. First, California attorneys are required to complete an
extensive training program in the practice of law, either by graduating from
an accredited law school or completing a legal apprenticeship with an
attorney or judge in the state.184 Then, attorneys must successfully pass an
“examination in professional responsibility or legal ethics,” traditionally the
Multistate Professional Responsibility Examination (MPRE).185 Finally,
attorneys must pass the California bar exam, which is designed to ensure the
attorneys are minimally competent in the practice of law.186 There is no
corollary educational or testing requirement for talent agents to prove
minimal competence. Nothing in the Talent Agencies Act or the General
Rules and Regulations for Artists’ Managers requires a person to go through
a training or educational process, to pass an examination on business ethics
or fiduciary duties of agents, or to pass an examination which generally tests

182. Daniel Miller, Selling Stardom: A talent agent and a trail of unhappy clients, L.A.
TIMES (Nov. 21, 2015, 3:00 AM), https://www.latimes.com/entertainment/la-et-selling-star
dom-20151122-htmlstory.html.
183. Id.
184. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 6060(e) (1939).
185. Id. at § 6060(f).
186. Id. at § 6060(g).
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their competence to procure employment for artists. While many of the large
agencies offer training, neither the Act nor the regulations require it prior to
the state’s granting of a license under the Act.
The second major difference is the Rules for Professional Conduct for
attorneys. There simply is no analogous regulatory scheme for talent agents
under the Talent Agencies Act. The Marathon Court suggested that the Act
and regulations establish a “code of conduct” for talent agents. Certainly the
Act and regulations mandate specific requirements agents must fulfill to
conform to the Act itself, such as posting copies of their licenses and the Act
in their office,187 posting a surety bond,188 and prescribing forms for agency
agreements.189 However, these do not rise to the level of ethical duties
broadly regulating the relationship between the talent agents and the artists.
The Code of Professional Conduct for attorneys, on the other hand,
specifically regulates the attorney-client relationship and prescribes broad
duties attorneys owe to their clients.
Chapter 1 of the Rules of Professional Conduct specifically relates to
the Lawyer-Client Relationship. Therein, the rules set forth broad duties that
attorneys owe to their clients, the most important of which is “[t]he duty of
undivided loyalty” to the client as set forth in Rule 1.7.190 This most
important rule specifically prohibits the same conflicts-of-interest the talent
agents are accused of that led directly to the showdown in 2019. Rule 1.7
provides that: “[a] lawyer shall not, without informed written consent from
each client . . . represent a client if the representation is directly adverse to
another client in the same or a separate matter.”191 And a “lawyer shall not,
without informed written consent from each affected client . . . represent a
client if there is a significant risk the lawyer’s representation of the client
will be materially limited by the lawyer’s responsibilities to or relationships
with another client, a former client or a third person, or by the lawyer’s own
interests.”192 In one rule, the foundations are laid to prevent all abuses alleged
against the talent agents, if talent agents were subject to such a rule or its
corollary.
The commentary to Rule 1.7 states that a “directly adverse conflict” can
arise in a number of ways, including a lawyer’s “representation of more than
one client in a matter in which the interests of the clients actually conflict.”193
It should go without saying that if an attorney represented both the buyer and
seller of real estate that such an attorney would run afoul of Rule 1.7.

187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.

CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 1700.5, 1700.28.
Id. at § 1700.15.
Id. at § 1700.23.
CAL. R. PROF. CONDUCT 1.7, cmt. 1.
Id. at R. 1.7(a).
Id. at R. 1.7(b).
Id. at R. 1.7, cmt. 1.
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However, nothing under the Talent Agencies Act or the regulations prohibits
a talent agent from representing both the buyer and seller of a screenplay or
of a television writer’s services. Rule 1.8.1 explicitly forbids an attorney
from “knowingly acquir[ing] [a] . . . pecuniary interest adverse to a
client.”194 Combined with Rule 1.8.6, which mandates that even if an
attorney is compensated by somebody other than the client that the attorney’s
sole duty is to the client, an attorney would never be permitted to accept a
fee from an opposing party in a negotiation. However, nothing in the TAA
or its regulations has prevented talent agents from negotiating packaging fees
from studios and networks, often to the financial detriment (and creative
detriment) of its own clients.
And Rule 1.8.1 also explicitly forbids an attorney from “entering into a
business transaction with a client,” because it would require the attorney to
negotiate against himself. In other words, an attorney would run afoul of the
rule if the attorney entered negotiations to hire his own client while
purporting to represent the client. It prevents self-dealing. However, nothing
in the TAA prevents talent agents from entering into business transactions
with the artists they represent. As the major talent agencies have turned into
content production companies – hiring entities – this has given rise to the
self-dealing conflicts that have arisen as the talent agencies have become
representatives of their clients in negotiations with the talent agencies
themselves. Suffice to say, the State Bar Act and the Rules of Professional
Conduct for attorneys do not merely provide an alternative regulatory
scheme to the Talent Agencies Act; together they actually constitute a better
regulatory scheme to protect attorneys’ clients who are Hollywood writers
and other artists.
D. The Labor Commission’s Solis decision results in the Talent
Agencies Act’s interference with the Rules of Professional Conduct,
and therefore unreasonably interferes with the State Bar Act and the
attorney-client relationship
When applying Solis, the Talent Agencies Act unreasonably interferes
with the California Rules of Professional Conduct for attorneys because it
statutorily subrogates an attorney’s ethical duties to the client to the
discretion of the talent agent. In Solis, the Labor Commission cites its
decision in Danielewski for the proposition that under the Talent Agencies
Act, “an unlicensed person may nevertheless participate in negotiating an
employment contract for an artist, provided he or she does so ‘in conjunction
with, and at the request of a licensed talent agent.’”195 This unreasonably

194.
195.

Id. at R. 1.8.1.
Solis, TAC-27089 at 7, 6.
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interferes with an attorney’s responsibilities under the Rules of Professional
Conduct to act on behalf of and at the instruction of the client alone.
The Rules of Professional Conduct set forth one overarching rule:
undivided loyalty to the client.196 As set forth in the first chapter, “[l]oyalty
and independent judgment are essential elements in the lawyer’s relationship
to a client.” Rule 2.1 requires that “[i]n representing a client, a lawyer shall
exercise independent professional judgment and render candid advice” to the
client alone.197 All other attorney duties flow from this maxim. For instance,
Rule 1.2 states that “a lawyer shall abide by a client’s decisions concerning
the objectives of representation,” and that “a lawyer may take such action
on behalf of the client as is impliedly authorized to carry out the
representation.”198
But in furtherance of Rule 1.7’s duty of undivided loyalty, attorneys are
not simply mandated to render independent professional judgment in the
course of their representation of a client. The rules of professional conduct
create a de facto regime in which attorneys are absolutely prohibited from
taking direction from or relinquishing control of the representation to any
person other than the client. For instance, Rule 1.8.6 expressly prohibits an
attorney from “enter[ing] into an agreement for, charg[ing], or accept[ing]
compensation for representing a client from one other than the client unless
there is no interference with the lawyer’s independent professional judgment
or with the lawyer-client relationship.”199 Rule 5.3, while traditionally
examined in the context of legal assistants and outside experts, clearly places
the ultimate responsibility of a representation on the lawyer and not on the
non-lawyer.200 And Rule 5.5 explicitly prohibits attorneys from “knowingly
assist[ing] a person in the unauthorized practice of law” within the state.201
A talent agent who is unlicensed as an attorney is clearly engaged in the
unauthorized practice of law in California, supra.
These rules were specifically drafted decades ago, in their original
form, to protect the public and the client. But the Labor Commission’s Solis
decision unreasonably interferes with these rules. By suggesting that an
attorney may negotiate a talent contract only “in conjunction with, and at the
request of a licensed talent agent,” the Labor Commission effectively neuters
the long-standing rule that an attorney’s duties are owed solely to the client,
and that the client shall direct and control the representation. Furthermore, it
interferes with the rules because it creates a direct conflict wherein the
196. CAL. R. PROF. CONDUCT 1.7, cmt. 1.
197. Id. at R. 2.1.
198. Id. at R. 1.2(a)(emphasis added).
199. Id. at R. 1.8.6(a).
200. Id. at R. 5.3(c)(1)(“With respect to a nonlawyer . . . associated with a lawyer[,] a
lawyer shall be responsible for conduct of such a person if . . . the lawyer orders or, with
knowledge of the relevant facts and of the specific conduct, ratifies the conduct involved”).
201. Id. at R. 5.4(a)(2).
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attorney not only is unauthorized to supervise the non-lawyer in the
representation (i.e., the talent agent), but is also subject to that person’s
direction. Solis sets the stage for an inevitable showdown: who controls the
negotiation with a studio or network when an attorney knows that the agent
is dragging his or her heels to get a packaging fee even though the client is
ready to close the deal?
The Labor Commission’s Solis/Danielewski subrogation requirement
endangers the attorney’s representation because it would lead to conflict
between the TAA director of the representation (i.e., the talent agent) and the
State Bar Act director of the representation (i.e., the writer or other talent).
What is the attorney’s duty if the agent insists that a packaging fee be
negotiated? What is the attorney’s duty if the attorney knows the agent is
trying to get the writer to take a lower fee? What is the attorney’s duty in a
negotiation if the client’s agency is also the adverse party, such as a
production company owned by the agency? Is the attorney’s duty to take
direction solely from the agent, in accordance with Solis and Danielewski?
Or is the attorney’s duty to take direction solely from the client, in
accordance with the Rules of Professional Conduct? The Labor
Commission’s interpretation of the Act creates these direct conflicts with the
Rules of Professional Conduct, despite the fact that the rules are set forth by
the California State Bar pursuant to its authority under the state
constitution202 and the State Bar Act.203 These conflicts cannot be resolved
except by rejection of the Labor Commission’s holding as set forth in Solis
and Danielewski.

V. Attorney Exemption from the Talent Agencies
Act More Reasonably Conforms to the Legislative Purpose of the
Statute and Greater Public Policy
In Solis, the Labor Commission placed too much emphasis on the black
letter of the Talent Agencies Act instead of construing the statute in the
context of its actual legislative purpose. The Solis construction effectively
leaves the rank-and-file artist without competent representation and creates
a fertile environment in which the abuses it was intended to protect against
actually incubate and thrive instead. Case in point, even with the Talent
Agencies Act in place, the writers it was intended to protect protested abuses
the statute failed to protect against. Had the statute fulfilled its purpose, those
complaints would not have arisen in the first place. The Solis decision has
merely given the talent agents legal grounds on which to fight for their piece
202. See CAL. CONST. ART. VI, § 9 (“The State Bar of California is a public corporation”).
203. See Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 6076 (“With the approval of the Supreme Court, the
Board of Trustees may formulate and enforce rules of professional conduct for all members
of the State Bar”).
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of the pie, at the expense of their principals - the creative clients they are
supposed to be fighting for instead. In short, the Talent Agencies Act and the
Labor Commission have failed the people placed under their care by the state
legislature.
In addition to the legal reasons California should reject Solis, the state
should exempt attorneys from the statute’s licensing requirements and
regulation for a myriad of sound public policy reasons. First among them is
that the State Bar Act and Rules of Professional Conduct for attorneys
provide not simply a “separate analogous licensing [and] regulatory
scheme,” but that the State Bar Act and Rules of Professional Conduct
provide a licensing and regulatory scheme that is actually better at achieving
the legislative aims of the Talent Agencies Act, supra. Other public policy
benefits include the following:
A. Attorney exemption results in no legal or actual conflict between
agents and attorneys
Nothing in either the Talent Agencies Act or the State Bar Act actually
prevents artists from engaging the services of both an agent and an attorney.
The common practice within the motion picture industry is for artists to have
both. Even by rejecting Solis and expressly exempting attorneys from
regulation under the Talent Agencies Act, nothing prevents the writer, actor
or director from engaging the services of both an agent and an attorney,
except perhaps agents who refuse to work with attorneys.204 The only
conflict arises from ATA’s suggestion that the Talent Agencies Act’s actual
purpose was to create a statutory monopoly for talent agents.205 While there
is no doubt that an unintended consequence of the statute was creation of
such a monopoly, no court has ever held that preventing competition against
talent agents was considered – let alone adopted – as a reason for enacting
the statute. Nor has any legislative material or history suggested this. Instead,
the only legislative purpose ever identified by the courts is the protection of
artists from “unscrupulous” talent marketers. Because the ATA’s
interpretation falls so far afield from the actual, true object of the statute, this
economic conflict is irrelevant. Preventing competition from attorneys is not
a purpose. Nor is it even unfair if it were, in fact, to occur because agents are
not effectively shut out of the business. If ever the competition is unfair, it is
because attorneys have the greater burden to bear in their licensing and
regulation.
204. See Edwin F. McPherson, The Talent Agencies Act: Time for a Change, 19
HASTINGS COMM. & ENTM’T. L.J. 899, 917-918 (1997).
205. See Putman Letter, supra note 57 (“The [ATA] considers any and all unlawful
procurement entered into at the behest of the WGA to be unfair and unlawful competition that
will harm the ATA and its member agencies”).
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B. Attorney exemption is more consistent with attorney licensing
exemptions in other states and licensed professions
Exempting attorneys from the statute would bring consistency to
licensing and regulation of “practice of law” activities across a variety of
professions in California, as well as other states. In many circumstances,
non-lawyers have been allowed to offer legal services. Historically, these
have included non-lawyers at banks, who “are permitted to draft routine
mortgages and non-lawyers are permitted to execute these legal documents
with blank clients.”206 In the real estate industry in most states, including
California, non-lawyers have been “given the power to execute contracts on
residential property in which the agent holds a commission,” similarly to
sales agents in the Hollywood industries.207 Accounting firms have been
permitted to expand their consulting services to include estate planning,
litigation support, valuation and business planning advice, and financial
planning.208 Certified, licensed legal assistants are permitted to do a wide
variety of activities that would constitute the practice of law in the state. An
interpretation of the Act as a conformance with the State Bar Act, infra,
would bring it in line with similar exemptions for other professions, and
bring consistency.
C. Attorney exemption provides better protections and access to legal
aid for below-the-line cast and crew
The Talent Agencies Act, as construed in the Labor Commission’s Solis
decision, is simply too broad. It does not cover employment agencies only
for above-the-line creative talent like actors, writers and directors. The term
“talent,” as used in Section 1700.4, brings under its auspices anybody who
represents any person who works on a movie or television show. In effect, it
requires every person who works on a film or television show to obtain an
agent simply to have an attorney review a contract for employment. The state
of California has no interest in compelling assistant make-up artists and key
grips to (i) find an agent, and (ii) pay a commission to an agent simply to
have access to an attorney who can review an employment or engagement
contract. No worker in any other industry in California is subjected to such
an onerous requirement simply to obtain work or have an employment
contract reviewed and negotiated by their legal counsel.
206. John S. Dzienkowski & Robert J. Peroni, Article, Multidisciplinary Practice and the
American Legal Profession: A Market Approach to Regulating the Delivery of Legal Services
in the Twenty-First Century, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 83, 95 (2000).
207. Id.
208. Id. at 104.
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D. Attorney exemption provides better protections and access to legal
assistance for up-and-coming above-the-line talent
The Talent Agencies Act creates yet another de facto caste system in
Hollywood. Agents’ livelihoods are dependent on talent, and they have
become more risk-averse over time. This is evident from their recent forays
into content acquisitions, packaging deals, and the evolution of talent agency
into a volume business. Whereas the Talent Agencies Act permits agents to
engage in development of their clients, agents today are overwhelmingly less
interested in doing so. After all, since they are dependent on an artist’s talent
for packages (and the few remaining commissions taken), they do not take
risks on new talent. Instead, agents favor a greater number of established
clients who have proven their ability to encourage packaging deals.
More often, up-and-coming talent have found agencies to be closed
shops, taking only solicited materials and rejecting even simple query letters.
This, in effect, leaves the up-and-coming writer, actor or director without
competent representation. Other commentators have noted the disparity
caused by the Talent Agencies Act itself:
Yet, who is the [Talent Agencies] Act really protecting if the manager
of a band that cannot get an agent will not (because he or she cannot)
negotiate (or assist the band in negotiating) a performance in a bar, or at a
wedding, or at a party. [] And what about the talent agent at one of the big
three agencies in Los Angeles, who (recently), when one of their actress
clients told them that she now had an attorney and that she would like them
to negotiate her future deals in conjunction with that attorney, responded,
“we don’t work with lawyers.” Is it really the artist that is being protected by
the Act, or is it the agent?
What about an actor who does not have the clout of Tom Cruise or
Sylvester Stallone, or even Gary Cole or Jennifer Rubin? Tom Cruise gets
the Creative Artists Agency’s full and complete attention every time he
sneezes; do other actors that are not of his stature? . . . So when the agent
says, ‘I don’t work with lawyers’ or ‘I don’t work with managers,’ what is
the actor to do, and how does the Act protect him in that situation?
There are many fine actors that cannot even get an agent. Does the Act
really protect them? And what about the actors who lives [sic] outside of Los
Angeles, where there is not such an abundance of agents – does the Act
protect them?209
While such commentary appears to focus on actors and musicians, the
critique of the statute – just as the statute itself – applies to all procurers of

209.

McPherson, supra note 204, at 917-918.
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employment for all artists. And therefore, the critique is equally applicable
to Hollywood writers.
If engaging the services of an agent is a prerequisite for an up-andcoming artist to engage the services of an attorney, then what is the artist to
do if no agent will represent them? In such a way, the Talent Agencies Act
serves only as an obstacle to the artists’ protection. But for Solis, the Talent
Agencies Act would not prohibit a licensed attorney from drafting, making,
fielding and/or negotiating offers and contracts for such up-and-coming
talent who may receive no interest from a talent agent. Attorneys are less
dependent on an artists’ talent because whereas talent agents are required by
law to be compensated only through commissions,210 attorneys are permitted
to take hourly fees to review and negotiate contracts. If up-and-coming artists
are effectively regulated out of the ability to retain the services of attorneys
because an agent will not sign them first, then they are wholly without
representation. This is clearly an unintended consequence of the legislature,
and must be avoided.
E. Attorney exemption prevents unintended protectionist and anticompetitive consequences of the Labor Commission’s Solis decision,
which have harmed the artists the Talent Agencies Act was enacted to
protect
The Labor Commission’s interpretation of the Act places an undue
burden on the public because it is protectionist and anti-competitive, which
irrationally limits access to competent legal counsel and limits artists’
options to choose their own representatives. First, by creating a duallicensing regime, attorneys are forced to take on extra costs in their practice
for what they otherwise would be permitted to do. As in any industry, those
costs are then passed along to the public, in a time when Americans across
the country struggle to afford legal assistance of any kind.211 Other
commentators have advocated for an increased allowance on the part of
states to permit non-lawyers to practice law in limited circumstances in order

210. See Dave McNary, California Moves to Tighten Rules on Talent Agent Scams,
VARIETY (Apr. 5, 2016, 7:19 PM), https://variety.com/2016/film/news/california-movingtighten-rules-talent-agent-scams-1201746849/ (“The Krekorian Talent Scam Prevention Act
of 2009 specifically prohibits talent services from engaging in the business of talent
representation and charging money upfront for the promise of securing jobs”).
211. See Deborah L. Rhode, Access to Justice: A Roadmap For Reform, 41 FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 1227, 1228-30 (2014); Rebecca L. Sandefur & Aaron C. Smyth, Access Across
America: First Report of the Civil Justice Infrastructure Mapping Project, at 2-4 (2011);
Benjamin P. Cooper, Access to Justice Without Lawyers, 47 AKRON L. REV. 205, 205-206,
221 (2015) (“Our country has a vexing access-to-justice crisis. Nobody denies this”).
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to respond to this crisis.212 In an age when the film industry is more and more
dominated by middle class, rank-and-file filmmakers instead of high-budget
studios and networks, legal costs must not be allowed to be artificially
inflated by a statutory requirement that attorneys carry an additional license
that offers nothing to the client. This is a matter of the public’s access to
justice and competent legal counsel.
Second, much to the chagrin of the talent agents, this holding would
likely lead to greater competition between attorneys and talent agents. But
such reservations are hypocritical. When the Talent Agencies Act was first
enacted in 1978, it unintentionally created the monopoly that arguably exists
today. Prior to that, agents and managers competed to procure engagements
(the incidental procurement provision of the Labor Code then still being
law), and yet there was no great outcry from the ATA. While monopolization
favoring talent agents has long been debunked as the legislature’s intent in
enacting the TAA, supra, the public is actually better off for such
competition. Cars replaced horses and buggies, and video killed the radio
star. Just as writers once had the option to rely on both agents and managers,
the public should not be denied the choice of using an agent or attorney to
negotiate their employment contracts and sales of their intellectual property.
Some creatives may prefer to utilize the services of an attorney alone.
For instance and perhaps most famously among them is Bill Murray, who
fired his agents in favor of his attorney to field offers from filmmakers.213
Artists of a lower professional stature will not be regulated out of the market
for competent representation, because unlike talent agents who rely
exclusively on the talent of their clients to make a living, attorneys may not
find themselves so constrained. This gives the up-and-coming screenwriter
an opportunity to engage his attorney uncle for a first-time gig instead of
having to cross his fingers and hope that an agent will take an interest in him
simply to negotiate a low-dollar option agreement. This gives established
artists, like Murray, the right to choose for themselves whether they need
agents in their lives at all, or if they simply need an attorney to negotiate
offers when they come in. On the other hand, the middle-tier artist may prefer
a talent agent whose job is to actually track down offers and be a salesman,
whereas an attorney may simply field offers as they come to the artist. The
public’s freedom of choice in this matter should be paramount.
212. E.g. Richard Zorza & David Udell, Article, New Roles for Non-Lawyers to Increase
Access to Justice, 41 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1259, 1262 (2014) (“Sometimes an expert nonlawyer is better than a lawyer non-expert”).
213. Eric Kohn, Bill Murray Explains Why He Created a Secret 1-800 Number to Be
Reached About Roles, INDIEWIRE (June 10, 2019, 3:29 PM), https://www.indiewire.com/
2019/06/bill-murray-1-800-number-explained-1202148757/; see also Nate Jones, Here Is
What Happens When You Call Bill Murray’s 1-800 Number, VULTURE (Oct. 3, 2014), https://
www.vulture.com/2014/10/guide-to-calling-bill-murrays-1-800-number.html (“He heard
nothing until Murray’s lawyer got in touch”).
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VI. The Talent Agencies Act Must Either be Legislatively
Amended or Legally Construed to Resolve the Foregoing
Absurdities and
Conflicts Created by the Labor Commission’s Solis Decision, and
to Protect the Public
A. Ideally, the California legislature will utilize the New York Bar
Association’s approach to statutorily resolve the foregoing conflicts
The 1985 Entertainment Commission was formed specifically to survey
the law of entertainment states and capitals and to aid the California
legislature in the drafting of the Talent Agencies Act as a model statute,
supra. However, the modern-day Talent Agencies Act lands far afield from
this target, especially in light of the California Labor Commission’s decision
in Solis.
In 2015, attorneys in the other great American entertainment capital
took issue with California’s Solis decision. That year, the New York State
Bar Association’s Entertainment, Arts and Sports Law Section (“NYBAEASL”) drafted and proposed legislation specifically exempting attorneys
from the licensing requirements of talent agencies.214 In 2017, the New York
City Bar Association’s Entertainment Law Committee (“NYCBA-ELC”)
drafted a memorandum in support of the NYBA-EASL’s proposed
legislation.215
An important distinction between the New York law and the California
law is that New York retains an “incidental procurement” provision for nonagents, whereas California has unequivocally rejected this safe-harbor.216
While the NYBA-EASL and NYCBA-ELC both support an interpretation
214. Marc Jacobson, Writers Guild of America Agrees to Pay Lawyers Representing
Writers Who Fired Their Agents, N.Y. STATE BAR ASS’N. (Apr. 17, 2019), http://nysbar.com/
blogs/EASL/2019/04/writers_guild_of_america_agree.html; also Memorandum from the
New York State Bar Association Entertainment, Arts, and Sports Law Section In Support of
the Introduction and Enactment of Proposed Legislation to Exempt Attorneys From The
Licensing Requirements of Theatrical Employment Agencies (Nov. 19, 2015), http://
nysbar.com/blogs/EASL/NYSBA%20-%20EASL%20Atty%20Exemption%20memo%20SHR%20Revision%20-%20111915%5B1%5D%5B1%5D%5B1%5D.pdf [herein NYSBEASL].
215. Entm’t. Law Comm., Report, Report By The Entertainment Law Committee In
Support of Amendments To The Definition of “Theatrical Employment Agency” Under New
York State Law As Proposed By The New York State Bar Association Entertainment, Arts and
Sports Law Section. Ass’n. of the Bar of the City of N.Y. (Sept. 2017), https://www.nycbar.
org/member-and-career-services/committees/reports-listing/reports/detail/report-supportingamendments-to-the-definition-of-theatrical-employment-agency-as-proposed-by-the-nysbar-association-entertainment-arts-and-sports-law-section [herein NYCBA-ESL].
216. N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 171.8; N.Y. Arts and Cultural Affairs Law § 37.01.3.
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that attorneys would be covered under this exemption,217 they note the risk
that New York courts may be influenced by the California Labor
Commission’s Solis decision.218 In proposing a statutory amendment
unequivocally exempting attorneys from licensing requirements and
regulation under the New York laws, both the NYBA-EASL and NYCBAELC note the extraordinary licensing requirements and strict disciplinary
measures to which attorneys are subjected, supra.219 The NYBA-EASL also
notes that attorneys are statutorily exempted from licensing requirements in
many other industries, and that they play a unique role in the representation
of artists:
The role of the entertainment attorney is particularly unique
in that the attorney’s primary role is to review and negotiate
contracts in the best interest of the artist client. Entertainment
attorneys generally understand the business and develop significant
contacts in the entertainment industries that may prove beneficial
for the artists they represent. Failure to exempt attorneys from the
agency license requirement may prevent attorneys from fully
advocating for or acting on behalf of their clients.
...
Even though the current statutes pertaining to theatrical employment
agencies do not specifically exclude attorneys, [the NYSB-EASL] believe[s]
that the licensure obligations were meant for non-attorneys who, while not
held to the same professional, regulatory, and ethical standards imposed
upon attorneys, must comply with some measure of requirements designed
to protect the public.220
While New York has yet to implement the NYSB-EASL and NYCBAESL amendments to its talent agencies laws, New York attorneys have made
a highly persuasive case to the Empire State’s legislature for doing so. If
California truly wants the Talent Agencies Act to become adopted as a model

217. NYSB-EASL, supra note 214, at 1; NYCBA-ESL, supra note 215, at 1.
218. NYSB-EASL, supra note 214, at 3 (“a representative of the New York City
Department (‘DCA’) of Consumer Affairs stated in response to a query at a recent New York
City Bar Association program that it is possible that an attorney negotiating an employment
agreement for an Artist could be found to be an unlicensed talent agent”); NYCBA-ESL,
supra note 215, at 3 (“As the law is currently drafted, attorneys negotiating employment
agreements or otherwise procuring employment for their clients could be held to violate the
New York General Business Law, which is a misdemeanor crime, in addition to suffering the
damages caused by having an otherwise enforceable attorney-client agreement rendered void
and unenforceable”).
219. NYSB-EASL, supra note 214, at 3-4; NYCBA-ESL, supra note 215, at 4.
220. NYSB-EASL, supra note 214, at 5-6.
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talent representation statute across all jurisdictions, it would do well to take
the critiques of New York’s attorneys to heart. The California legislature
needs to take up the amendment of the statute to statutorily reject the Solis
construction, and to unequivocally exempt attorneys from its licensing
requirements and regulations.
B. Alternatively, or at least until the state legislature acts, California
courts should construe the Talent Agencies Act as a statutory
exemption from liability for the unauthorized practice of law as
permitted under the State Bar Act
Until the California state legislature amends the Talent Agencies Act to
exempt attorneys from the statute’s requirements, California courts have
built into the California code a judicial means of resolving the conflict.
Section 6126 of the Business and Professions Code (i.e., of the State Bar
Act) prohibits practicing law without a license. However, that is not the sum
total of its effect. Section 6126 prohibits from practicing law without an
attorney’s license “[a]ny person . . . who is not an active licensee of the State
Bar, or otherwise authorized pursuant to statute or court rule to practice law
in this state.”221 In other words, the State Bar Act provides a statutory safe
harbor in which the Talent Agencies Act already lies. The State Bar Act
expressly authorizes certain individuals who are licensed as talent agents to
engage in the practice of law (i.e., offering, accepting, drafting and
negotiating contracts) without being licensed as attorneys in California. Until
such time as the state legislature amends the Talent Agencies Act, California
courts would be well advised to use this as a simple means of addressing the
conflict because it prevents absurd outcomes in enforcement, better protects
the intended beneficiaries of the act (i.e., the artists), and addresses a
multitude of public policy concerns in which the Talent Agencies Act is
deficient in the effecting of its stated purpose.

VII. Conclusion222
CUT TO:
EXT. HOLLYWOOD – SUMMER 2020
Much happened in the year following termination of the AMBA and the
Writers’ Guild’s installation of the CCFA as the union’s new franchise
agreement. In the days immediately following AMBA’s effective
termination, more lawyers got involved. On April 17, 2019, the Writers
Guild and a handful of individual writers, including David Simon, filed a
221. Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 6126(a) (emphasis added).
222. The conclusions herein are consistent with all other research and commentary on the
issue of whether the Talent Agencies Act encompasses attorneys as regulated persons.
McPherson, supra note 204; O’Brian, supra note 96.
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lawsuit in state court against the Big Four talent agencies WME, CAA, UTA
and ICM.223 The complaint alleged that the agencies are liable for breaches
of fiduciary duties and unfair business practices. In June 2019, the agencies
punched back, filing a separate lawsuit in federal court against the Writers
Guild for violation of antitrust laws, alleging the WGA engaged in “wanton
abuse of union authority” by organizing and leading an “unlawful group
boycott” of writers against the agencies, which included “inducing certain
unlicensed . . . lawyers into joining the conspiracy by telling them that they
should perform the work of boycotted talent agents even though it is illegal
for them to do so,” alluding to the Solis decision.224 In August 2019, the
Guild dropped its claims in state court and filed them as counter-claims in
the federal antitrust case brought by the agencies.225 In February 2020, the
federal district court in Los Angeles ordered the Guild and the agencies to
mediation, where the case remains today.226
Aside from the courtroom wrestling matches between the Guild and the
agents, the rank-and-file screenwriter was forced to enter the 2019 and 2020
staffing seasons without their agency representatives. However, the standoff did not stop television and movies from getting made. It merely changed
the process. Showrunners, staff writers and screenwriters found themselves
soliciting pitches and meetings from writers directly, without needing to
contact their agents first. Writers directly solicited employment and
engagements directly through Guild-generated Internet submission boards,
“self-advocacy, direct submission, and Twitter boosts” like
#WGASolidarityChallenge and #WGAStaffingBoost.227 At bars throughout
Los Angeles, producers, showrunners, and writers met in person at mixers
thrown whereby writers and employers could meet each other directly. Most
223. Compl., Writers Guild of Am. W., Inc. v. WME Entm’t., No. 19SMCV00725 (Cal.
Super. Ct. April 17, 2019)(Complaint, Doc. 1); also Jonathan Handel, Writers Guild Sues
Talent Agencies as Dispute Goes Nuclear, HOLLYWOOD REPORTER (Apr. 17, 2019, 10:07
AM), https://www.hollywoodreporter.com/thr-esq/writers-guild-sues-talent-agencies-as-dis
pute-goes-nuclear-1202631.
224. Compl., William Morris Endeavor Entm’t, LLC v. Writers Guild of Am. W., Inc.,
No. 2:19-CV-05465-AB-FFMx (June 24, 2019); also David Robb, WME Sues WGA For
“Unlawful Group Boycott” In Violation of Antitrust Laws; WGA Says Suit Has “No Merit”
– Update, DEADLINE (June 24, 2019, 2:23 PM), https://deadline.com/2019/06/wme-sueswriters-guild-anitrust-hollywood-boycott-wga-1202637020/.
225. David Robb, WGA Drops Lawsuit Filed In State Court Against Big 4 Agencies,
Consolidates Claims In Federal Court – Update, DEADLINE (Aug. 19, 2019, 3:19 PM),
https://deadline.com/2019/08/wga-withdraws-talent-agency-lawsuit-state-court-caa-wme-u
ta-1202671876/.
226. Wendy Lee, In a Deadlock, WGA and large talent agencies turn to a mediator, L.A.
TIMES (Feb. 20, 2020), https://www.latimes.com/entertainment-arts/business/story/2020-0220/wga-talent-agencies-wme-caa-mediator.
227. Emily Witt, Hollywood Writers Attempt Life Without Agents, NEW YORKER (June 6,
2019), https://www.newyorker.com/news/letter-from-los-angeles/hollywood-writers-attem
pt-life-without-agents.
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showrunners and writers found the “new normal” the same or even better
than the old normal. Krista Vernoff, showrunner of Grey’s Anatomy, noted
that her new writing staff was “the most diverse, inclusive group I’ve ever
hired. It took extra effort for sure, but it was actually fun.”228 For
showrunners like David Simon, however, almost nothing changed: “after 25
years in this game, I haven’t once hired a writer who was introduced to me
by an agent.”229
Once offers were solicited and made directly, though, the writers relied
on their professional representatives to negotiate those deals. A minority of
writers used backchannels and clandestine tactics to engage their exagents.230 But many writers found help from their attorneys, who have been
“forced . . . to walk a legal tightrope” thanks to Solis.231 In the highest-profile
deals, writers and showrunners appeared to have relied on their attorneys
alone in efforts to remain aboveboard. For example, Game of Thrones
creators David Benioff and D. B. Weiss used the services of their attorney
alone in negotiating a $200 million deal with Netflix.232
On May 16, 2019, the Verve agency, unaffiliated with the ATA, became
the first prominent talent agency to sign the CCFA, thus giving rise to its
nickname: The Verve Agreement.233 Within three months, roughly 75
boutique agencies signed onto the CCFA’s terms.234 Starting in the summer
of 2019, many mid-tier Hollywood talent agencies finally capitulated and
began to accept the terms of the new CCFA. Within a year, major firms The
Gersh Agency and Paradigm signed onto the new franchise agreement and
code of conduct.235 By April 2020, the hold-outs remained the Big Four
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. Bryn Elise Sandberg, Writers and Agents Confront the New Normal: “Hypocrisy All
Over the Place”, HOLLYWOOD REPORTER (Sept. 19, 2019, 8:00 AM), https://www.hollywood
reporter.com/features/writers-agents-confront-new-normal-hypocrisy-all-place-1240226.
231. Wendy Lee, Hollywood’s lawyers play on-call doctors in drama between WGA and
agencies, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 18, 2019), https://www.latimes.com/entertainment-arts/busin
ess/story/2019-09-17/hollywoods-lawyers-play-on-call-doctors-in-drama-between-wga-andagencies; see also Sandberg, supra note 230.
232. Sandberg, supra note 230.
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Signs 5-Year Agreement With Writers Guild, HOLLYWOOD REPORTER (Mar. 23, 2020, 12:03
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agencies: CAA, ICM, UTA and WME.236 In July 2020, UTA crossed the line
and became the first of the Big Four to drop its lawsuit and sign the CCFA.237
However, a year later, the standoff continues with CAA, ICM and WME still
locked in their lawsuit with the WGA.
But even assuming every agency in Hollywood accepts the terms of the
CCFA, the issue is not moot. The agreement covers only the relationship
between Guild writers and franchised agencies. It does not cover the
thousands of non-union writers creating scripts for independent films and
series. Nor does the agreement cover the relationship between the tens of
thousands of actors, directors, musicians and other statutory “artists” and
their talent agents who work on the fringes of the industry, sometimes for
jobs paying less than minimum wage. It is this largest part of the industry –
the up-and-comers, the rank-and-file, the non-stars – who must rely
exclusively on the protections of laws like the Talent Agencies Act because
no union will have them yet. If the law will not protect them, then these
artists ought to be able to rely on competent and ethical legal counsel to act
on their behalf.
The Association of Talent Agents is incorrect in its assertion that
attorneys are prohibited from negotiating employment contracts and sales
agreements on behalf of writers in the film and television industries in
California. While the association relies on Solis, such reliance is flawed. No
California court has ever adopted the Labor Commission’s interpretation of
the Talent Agencies Act. Nor does the statute or legislative history support
the Labor Commission’s interpretation of the Act. Instead, California courts
are cautioned that adopting this interpretation invariably will lead to absurd
results and conflicts with attorneys’ duties under the state constitution, the
State Bar Act and the California Rules for Professional Responsibility.
Instead, California courts should interpret the Talent Agencies Act as a
statutory exemption from liability for the unauthorized practice of law. This
simple construction of the Act provides several benefits, both legal and
practical. Legally, this construction it is expressly permitted not only by the
State Bar Act, but also as a “separate analogous licensing scheme” implied
in the California courts’ prior holdings construing application of the Talent
Agencies Act. Legally, this makes it internally consistent between both
statutes. It also is consistent with the clear policy of the legislature as
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evidenced not only by the plain language of the Talent Agencies Act today,
but also through its century-long legislative history.
The practical policy reasons for this interpretation are clear, too. First,
this holding gives the public a greater right of choice when it comes to artists’
representatives: writers can choose a talent agent or an attorney, which
expands the labor market for artists’ representatives. But this does not
prevent an artist from retaining the services of both a talent agent and an
attorney. This also gives artists a greater choice in her protections. A writer
may engage the services of a talent agent unlicensed as an attorney due to
such agent’s reputation, even if the tradeoff is lesser protections in relation
to potential conflicts-of-interest. Or a writer may engage the services of an
attorney unlicensed as a talent agent to obtain greater protection through the
Rules of Professional Conduct, even if the tradeoff requires more time and
money on the client’s part to obtain an initial offer. Furthermore, giving this
choice to writers better ensures against the harms the Talent Agencies Act
was enacted to prevent in the first place which is protection of the artists in
the first place. Nothing in the Talent Agencies Act has protected artists from
the abuses arising from packaging deals and the attendant conflicts-ofinterest. However, the Rules of Professional Conduct do exactly that.
FADE TO BLACK.
THE END.
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